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the federal criminal code, the interpretation of which has been hotly
contested within the legal system. We will first analyze one interpretive
problem that was the subject of the divided Supreme Court decision of
United States v. Smith1 in 1993, and then turn to another interpretive
problem that divided the nine judges of the federal court of appeals from
the District of Columbia and will be argued before the Supreme Court
during the fall of 1995 in the consolidated cases of United States v. Bailey
and United States v. Robinson3 ("the Bailey case").
Are there linguistic features of the statutory text itself that generate such
demonstrably "hard" cases? Our analysis does identify such features, but
also derives from "common sense" understanding of the text linguistic
principles for distinguishing between competing interpretations. By
including in our analysis an interpretive problem yet to be definitively
resolved by the Supreme Court we continue the experimental approach of
combining law and linguistics reported in the 1994 article, Plain Meaning
and Hard Cases4 that brings the two disciplines together not merely to
critique past judicial decisionmaking but to imagine ways such interdisci-
plinary collaboration could actually be of practical use to judges faced with
the challenge of deciding hard cases.
The two interpretive problems focus on the meaning of "uses" in the
phrase "uses or carries a firearm" in section 924(c) of Title 18.' Because
1. 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
2. 995 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1993), afidon different grounds, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en
bane), and cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3780 (1995).
3. 997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc), and cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3780 (1995). This text first came to our attention when
Kent Greenawalt brought up the Smith decision and Justice Scalia's criticism of the decision, during
the Law and Linguistics Conference. Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q. 857-58
(1995). After the conference Cunningham continued to review cases for which the Court was granting
review for the 1995-96 term looking for issues that might be amenable to linguistic analysis, a project
he had started for the conference. When review was granted in the Bailey and Robinson cases, he asked
Fillmore to do a preliminary semantic analysis. The results of that analysis seemed sufficiently
interesting that we agreed to write this article for this symposium issue. None of the parties nor their
attorneys in the Bailey orRotinson cases asked us to work on this topic. Our contact with the attorneys
has been largely limited to obtaining information about the status of the case and copies of the briefs.
Although in response to their requests, we sent a draft copy to attorneys for both petitioners and the
government a month before the reply brief was due.
4. Clark D. Cunningham et al., 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994); see also Jeffrey P. Kaplan et al.,
Bringing Linguistics into Judicial Decisionmaking: Semantic Analysis Submitted to the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1 Forensic Linguistics (forthcoming 1995). Both articles have the same four co-authors: a law
professor, Cunningham, and three linguistics professors: Judith N. Levi, Georgia M. Green, and Jeffrey
P. Kaplan.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1995).
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in both the Smith and Bailey cases the majority and dissenting opinions
made much of "common parlance" and "the ordinary use of the English
language"' we begin our analysis by using standard linguistic methods.
This analysis indicates that in everyday English the meaning of the verb
use7 is very general and thus highly dependent on context, in particular its
direct object and any other accompanying phrases.
We identify two distinctly different ways in which context can affect
interpretation of the phrase use afirearm. The first relates to the nature of
firearms as artifacts, raising the interpretive question whether the firearm
is to be understood as being used according to its manufactured function,
"the default interpretation." The disagreement among the justices in Smith
v. United States' over the "plain meaning" of the phrase can be explained
as a debate as to whether the statutory context pointed only to the default
interpretation.
The second distinction is between "eventive" and "designative"
interpretations of use afirearm. In the eventive interpretation, use afirearm
indicates that a specific event took place in which the firearm played an
instrumental role. In the designative interpretation, use afirearm may only
designate a particular intended function for the firearm without any event
having yet taken place. As we read the Bailey decision, the majority opted
for a designative interpretation while the dissenters read the statute as
limited to an eventive interpretation.
Thus far in our analysis, the methods of linguistics serve to bring to
conscious awareness the "common sense" that judges share with all native
speakers about everyday language. Our expectation is that these semantic
distinctions would enable judges to articulate what they already "know"
about possible interpretations of use afirearm, in much the same way that
rules of syntax can explain how a speaker "knows" that one utterance is
well-formed while another utterance is not (even though that speaker might
not be able to state the syntactical rule).9 In relation to the Bailey case, we
continue this focus on "common sense" understanding of the text as
everyday language by looking at the way the combination of "or carries"
6. See infra notes 14-20 and 50-75 and accompanying text.
7. We follow the standard convention in linguistics of using italics rather than quote marks when
referring to a word or phrase as a linguistic term.
8. 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
9. More than a century ago the Supreme Court indicated its willingness to use dictionaries in the
same way we urge that linguistics be used now: "in regards to all words in our own tongue... not as
evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court." Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S.
304, 307 (1893) (citations omitted).
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with "uses" invites the eventive interpretation. However, we go beyond the
conventional methods of linguistics to test the distinction between
designative and eventive interpretation for the specific legal context of the
statute.
The first legal context we examine is synchronic: the entire text of Title
18 of the United States Code in its current form. Review of every provision
in which use appears together with some variant of weapon reveals patterns
consistently explicated by the designative/eventive distinction, patterns that
once again point toward an eventive interpretation of section 924(c). In
particular we note that elsewhere in Title 18 Congress relies on variations
of the verb possess, not use, where it imposed criminal penalties in
situations that could have been described as using a firearm in the
designative sense. Title 18 does contain provisions that invite a designative
interpretation of use but only in provisions that share two features: (1) they
are exceptions to criminal liability, and (2) the designative interpretation is
marked by afor phrase (not found in section 924(c)).
The second legal context is diachronic: the history of how the text of
section 924(c) has evolved in Congress to its current form. Again the
designative/eventive distinction proves to be a useful heuristic. The text as
originally enacted clearly limited use a firearm to an eventive interpreta-
tion. No single subsequent amendment marked an expansion to a designa-
tive interpretation; rather, the intersection of textual features in the current
statute that is now used to support arguments for a designative interpreta-
tion appears to be an unintended result of three unrelated amendments by
three separate Congresses. Our review of Title 18 also led us to discover
a series of unsuccessful legislative amendments from 1989 to the present,
all of which appeared to have the purpose of extending section 924(c) to
fact patterns like the Bailey case, but by adding possess to the text rather
than by clarifying or defining use to point to a designative interpretation.
Our experience in this project has been that the approaches of our
respective disciplines of law (Cunningham) and linguistics (Fillmore) have
been mutually edifying. Cunningham's idea to extend the data base from
conventional everyday discourse to the text of Title 18 produced a set of
examples that led us to elaborate and sharpen Fillmore's initial semantic
analysis of use. In turn, Fillmore's semantic analysis enabled Cunningham
to put legislative history in a new perspective. Instead of using legislative
history in the conventional legal way as evidence for underlying goals and
purposes of Congress (an approach increasingly disfavored by the current
Supreme Court), we examine what we call "legislation history" in two ways
more consistent with attention to textual meaning. First, having found a
[VOL. 73:1159
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semantic anomaly in the current text, that apparently led the Bailey majority
to select a designative interpretation, we looked to see at what point in the
legislation history that anomaly might have been introduced."0 Second, we
examined the textual history of section 924(c) as if it were a coherent
discourse over time, an approach that may make unsuccessful amendments
more relevant than they are treated under current principles of statutory
interpretation.
In Part I we review the Smith decision and in Part II we summarize the
facts, procedural history and conflicting judicial opinions in the Bailey case.
Part III contains our linguistic analysis of use afirearm based on study of
both everyday discourse and the text of Title 18, and applies that analysis
to both the Smith and Bailey cases. In Part IV we examine the legislation
history of section 924(c) in light of our linguistic analysis.
I. PLAIN MEANING AND THE FIREARMS PENALTY STATUTE
Section 924(c) of Title 18 imposes a mandatory minimum five year
sentence on "[w]hoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm ' ("the firearms
penalty"). This term of imprisonment must be added to whatever sentence
is imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking offense,
and cannot be reduced by probation or parole. In Smith v. United States,' 2
the Court held by a 6-3 majority that "uses a firearm in relation to drug
trafficking" included bartering a MAC-10 machine gun in exchange for two
ounces of cocaine. 3
It is notable what the majority and dissenting opinions had in common.
Both Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, and Justice Scalia,
dissenting for himself, Justices Souter and Stevens, agreed that uses in the
firearms penalty should be interpreted according to "ordinary," "natural"
and "everyday" meaning and not as a technical word or "artfully defined"
legal term.'4 Neither relied at all on extra-textual evidence of legislative
10. Linguistic analysis of the statute at issue in United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259
(1994), by the authors of Plain Meaning also showed a peculiar variance from conventional usage,
leading them to an examination of legislative history that strongly suggested congressional error.
Cunningham et al., supra note 4, at 1579-82, cited in Granderson, 114 S. Ct. at 1267.
I1. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988).
12. 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
13. Id. at 2054.
14. Id. at 2054, 2061.
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intent such as committee reports or floor debates.15 There was only
cursory argument based on the presumed purpose of the statute or public
policy. 16 The ground of disagreement between the two factions appeared
to be entirely a matter of differing opinions about the meaning of everyday
language.'
7
Justice O'Connor wrote:
When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord
with its ordinary or natural meaning.. . . Surely petitioner's treatment of his
MAC-10 can be described as "use" within the everyday meaning of that term.
Petitioner "used" his MAC-10 in an attempt to obtain drugs by offering to
trade it for cocaine."5
We have observed that the rule of lenity "cannot dictate an implausible
interpretation of a statute nor one at odds with the generally accepted
contemporary meaning of a term." That observation controls this case. Both
a firearm's use as a weapon and its use as an item of barter fall within the
plain language of § 924(c)(1).19
Justice Scalia relied on his intuitions about everyday language to exactly
the same extent as Justice O'Connor:
In the search for statutory meaning, we give nontechnical words and phrases
their ordinary meaning.. . . To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use
15. Justice O'Connor mentions that Smith relied "on the legislative record" to argue that bartering
was not the kind of firearm use Congress contemplated in drafting the statute, without explication of
what specifically in the legislative record was argued by Smith. Id. at 2058. She dismisses any possible
evidence in the legislative history by reference to the language of the text: "It may well be that
Congress... had in mind a more obvious use of guns... but the language [of the statute] is not so
limited." Id. (quoting United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 256, 262) (brackets in original). See also id. at
2058 ("Even if we assume that Congress had intended the term "use" to have a more limited scope
when it passed the original version of § 924(c) in 1968 ... we believe it clearfrom the face of the
statute that the Congress that amended § 924(c) in 1986 did not.") (emphasis added).
16. In the penultimate paragraph of her opinion, Justice O'Connor states that the dissent's more
restrictive reading would do "violence not only to the structure and language of the statute, but to its
purpose as well." Id. at 2060. She goes on to say that Congress "was no doubt aware that drugs and
guns are a dangerous combination," quoting statistics about the correlation between homicide and drug
dealing in New York City and Washington, and pointing out that the gun offered for barter could have
been "converted instantaneously from currency to cannon." Id. Justice Scalia responds in his last
footnote: "The Court contends that giving the language its ordinary meaning would frustrate the purpose
of the statute .... Stretching language in order to write a more effective statute than Congress devised
is not an exercise we should indulge in." Id. at 2063 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia argue that their interpretations of "use a firearm" are
consistent with the meaning of that phrase in other provisions of federal criminal law, but these
arguments serve only to buttress their primary analysis based on everyday meaning.
18. Id. at 2054 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 2060 (citations omitted).
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it for its intended purpose. ... The Court does not appear to grasp the
distinction between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.
It is unquestionably not reasonable and normal, I think, to say simply "do
not use firearms" when one means to prohibit selling ... them.20
Given this reliance on everyday meaning, used by all members of the
Court in interpreting the firearms penalty in Smith, this statute actualizes
the hypothetical posed during the Law and Linguistics Conference:2  If
two justices disagree about the everyday meaning of a text, how can that
disagreement be resolved? And, in cases of such potential disagreement,
can a linguist provide useful information about the everyday meaning of a
text beyond what is available to a judge from her own intuitions as a native
speaker of English?
Fortuitously for us, the Supreme Court has decided to revisit the problem
of what "use a firearm" means in the firearms penalty statute by granting
review, almost exactly two years after Smith was decided, to a pair of
consolidated cases from the District of Columbia Circuit: United States v.
Robinson22 and United States v. Bailey.' Both cases, to be argued before
the Court sometime in the fall of 1995, present an issue that has plagued
the courts of appeal in every federal circuit:24 Where the evidence shows
that a drug trafficker has kept a firearm in an accessible location while
engaged in her drug operations, is that evidence by itself sufficient to
convict a defendant of "using a firearm" during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime?
II. THE ROBINSON AND BAILEY CASES
Candisha Robinson should not have answered the door when Larry Hale
knocked on July 15, 1991, but she did and she got him what he asked for,
a "rock" of crack cocaine.2 1 Unfortunately for her, Hale was an undercov-
er officer. The next night a search warrant was executed at her apart-
20. Id. at 2060 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
2 1. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 3, at 852-53.
22. 997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en bane), cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3780 (1995).
23. 995 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'd on different grounds, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en
bane), and cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3780 (1995).
24. See the summary of circuit court decisions interpreting "use or carry" in the en bane Bailey
opinion, 36 F.3d at 113, and in then-Chief Judge Breyer's dissent in United States v. McFadden, 13
F.3d 463, 468-70 (1st Cir. 1994).
25. Robinson, 997 F.2d at 885.
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ment.26 Inside a locked trunk in her bedroom closet the police found a
twenty-two caliber derringer and holster, two rocks of crack cocaine
weighing a little over ten grams, and twenty dollars in marked money.27
No ammunition for the derringer was found in the apartment.28
After a jury trial, Robinson was convicted of (1) distributing cocaine
base,29 (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in excess of
five grams,3" (3) maintenance of a crack house,31 and (4) use or carrying
of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.32 She was
sentenced to thirteen years of imprisonment;33 five of those years were
attributable solely to the firearms penalty.34
On appeal, a panel of three circuit judges voted two to one to reverse the
firearms penalty conviction.35 Then-Chief Judge Abner Mikva wrote for
the majority that "[g]iven the way section 924(c) is drafted, even if an
individual intends to use a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking
offense, the conduct of that individual is not reached by the statute unless
the individual actually uses the firearm for that purpose."3 6 He concluded
that "[t]he only reasonable view of the evidence in this case is that the gun
[merely] was intended for use at some future date."37
The government successfully sought review by the entire District of
Columbia Circuit bench, which consolidated en bane consideration of
Robinson with the case of United States v. Bailey.3"
Unfortumately for Roland Bailey, in May 1988, two officers of the
District of Columbia police department noticed his car was missing its front
license plate and had no inspection sticker.39 It was also unfortunate that
he was not carrying his driver's license. When he was ordered out of his
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 888.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) (1988).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iii) (1988).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (1988).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988). She was also convicted of committing these drug offenses within
1000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). 997 F.2d at 886.
33. 997 F.2d at 886.
34. 36 F.3d at 109.
35. 997 F.2d at 891.
36. Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 890.
38. 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
39. Id.
[VOL. 73:1159
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car, he produced only a District of Columbia identification card.4" While
exiting the car, Bailey pushed something between the seat and front console
of the car.4 ' One of the officers observed this action and searched the
passenger compartment, finding a round of ammunition and twenty-seven
plastic bags containing a total of thirty grams of cocaine.42 The police
arrested Bailey and then searched the trunk of the car, finding a loaded
pistol and $3,216 in small bills.43
Following a jury trial Bailey was convicted of (1) possession with intent
to distribute five grams or more of cocaine" and (2) using or carrying a
firearm during or in relation to that drug trafficking offense.45 He was
sentenced to fifty-one months imprisonment on the possession charge and
an additional five years on the firearms penalty.46 The conviction was
affirmed in a peculiar panel opinion. The opinion's purported author, Judge
Douglas Ginsburg, actually dissented from the major portion of the
opinion---on the issue of "using a firearm"-which was filed per curiam.47
Judge Ginsburg explained that he could not reconcile Bailey's conviction
with existing precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit interpreting the
firearms penalty.4" But he also made clear his opinion that the existing
precedent ought to be overruled, charitably referring to the work of his
predecessors with the well-known quote from Charles Dickens: "Sometimes
the law is 'a ass, a idiot.' 49
Judge Ginsburg's dissent made its point. The District of Columbia
Circuit granted en bane review of the Bailey case, consolidated it with the
Robinson case, and then issued a five to four decision50 that rewrote the
40. 995 F.2d 1113, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 995 F.2d at 1113, 1114. According to Bailey's brief on the merits before the Supreme Court,
the police found the gun "beneath 'a whole lot of items' including 'clothing and bags and other
things'." Brief for Petitioners at 2, United States v. Bailey, 63 U.S.L.W. 3780 (1995) Nos. 94-7448, 94-
7492 "The police could not see the gun when they opened the trunk; indeed, the trunk was so full that
it took roughly one minute to find the bag containing the gun." Brief for Petitioners at 2, 63 U.S.L.W.
3780
44. 995 F.2d at 1114-15 (conviction for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988)).
45. Id. (conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988)).
46. Id. at 1115.
47. ld. at l14n.*.
48 Id. at 1119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane). Judge Mikva, author of the
Robinson panel opinion that was reversed, participated in oral argument en banc but did not vote on
the decision, presumably because he had departed the bench by then to become special counsel to the
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law of the circuit as to the meaning of "use a firearm."'" Judge Ginsburg
wrote the en bane opinion for the majority.52
According to the en bane opinion, the District of Columbia Circuit had
developed, through a series of panel decisions, "an open-ended test that
[took] account of numerous factors arguably relevant to whether a gun was
used in relation to a drug trafficking offense."53 Among the numerous
factors that might determine whether a gun was "used" under the open-
ended test were "whether a gun is accessible to the defendant, whether it
is located in proximity to the drugs (which may cut either way depending
on the facts of a particular case), whether it is loaded, what type of weapon
it is, and finally, whether there is expert testimony to bolster the
government's particular theory of 'use'."54 Criticizing this approach as
producing "widely divergent results"55 and as intruding "into the province
of the jury," the en bane opinion sought to replace it with "a test that looks
to two factors only: the proximity of the gun to the drugs involved in the
underlying offense, and the accessibility of the gun to the defendant from
the place where the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds are
located. 5
6
The en bane opinion explains the basis for its new test in the space of
a single page-five paragraphs-that relies almost entirely on what Judge
Ginsburg argues is the ordinary meaning of "use a firearm."
The analysis begins:
In the context of § 924(c)(1), 'use' could be defined either narrowly, so as
to encompass only the paradigmatic uses of a gun, i.e., firing, brandishing,
or displaying the gun during the commission of the predicate offense, or more
broadly, so as to include the other ways in which a gun can be used to
facilitate drug trafficking. The narrow definition has the virtue of simplicity
... however; it is too narrow to capture all of the various uses of a firearm
that the Congress apparently intended to reach via § 924(c)(1).57
President. Had he remained on the bench until the decision, the District of Columbia Circuit might have
been stuck with a five to five split on these cases.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 108 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 110 (quoting United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
55. Id. at 112. Compare United States v. Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States
v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding firearm used); with United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d
1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding firearm not
used).
56. 36 F.3d at 108.
57. Id. at 114.
[VOL. 73:1159
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The second paragraph simply cites the Smith decision as authority for the
proposition that "Congress employed the term 'use' expansively" in the
firearms penalty."
The heart of the en bane opinion appears in the third paragraph:
A gun can surely be used even when it is not being handled, however. For
example, a gun placed in a drawer beside one's bed for fear of an intruder
would, in common parlance, be a gun 'used' for domestic protection. 9
Later in the opinion, Judge Ginsburg repeatedly transfers the "used for
domestic protection"'  example to describe the facts of the two cases as
"uses of a gun," because the guns were "used to protect the drug
trafficking operation.""
In the fourth paragraph, the en bane opinion cites as authority for "this
more inclusive understanding of 'use' a 19th century Supreme Court
opinion holding that a customs exemption for "wearing apparel in actual
use" applied to clothing purchased by the petitioner abroad and "intended
for his own use" even if it had not yet "been actually put on or applied to
its proper personal use."63 Judge Ginsburg also quotes in this paragraph
the following definition of "use" from Black's Law Dictionary: "[t]o make
use of; to convert to one's service; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry
out a purpose or action by means of."'
In the fifth and final paragraph, Judge Ginsburg announces the following
new definition of "use a firearm" to replace the "open-ended" approach:
[W]e hold that one uses a gun, i.e., avails oneself of a gun, and therefore
violates the statute, whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place
from which one (or one's agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to
facilitate a drug crime.65
58. 36 F.3d at 114 (quoting Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2058 (1993)).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 117.
62. Id. at 116.
63. Id. at 114-15 (quoting Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.S. 202, 213 (1884)).
64. Id. at 117. The quote comes from within the Smith opinion, thus giving it particular authority.
Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054 (1994) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY 1541 (6th
ed. 1990)). The Court in Smith also quoted WEBsTER's DICrTONARY, defining "to use" as "[t]o convert
to one's service" or "to employ." 113 S. Ct. at 2054 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2806 (2d ed. 1949)). Judge Ginsburg apparently found the Webster's definition less
helpful. It is peculiar for a court to quote only a law dictionary when making an assertion about the
ordinary meaning of a word.
65. Bailey, 36 F.3d at 115.
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It is important to be clear that Judge Ginsburg is not assuming that the
proximity of a gun to drugs or drug money is circumstantial evidence that
the defendant actually did "gain access to it" to facilitate a drug crime.
According to Judge Ginsburg, even if Bailey's gun never moved from the
trunk of the car or Robinson's derringer stayed, unloaded, in the locked
trunk in her closet, it is still a good use of everyday English to say that
these guns were used during the drug crimes-if only because knowledge
of their availability "emboldened" the defendants to commit the crimes:
[T]here is little reason to doubt that [Bailey] was using the gun in relation to
the possessory offense regardless of whether the gun actually furthered the
possessory offense or emboldened him to commit that offense.66
In equating "being emboldened [by a firearm]" with "using a firearm,"
Judge Ginsburg relies upon what he describes as the "seminal" opinion
interpreting the firearms penalty, United States v. Stewart,67 a 1985 Ninth
Circuit decision authored by now-Justice Kennedy.68
Like both the majority and dissenting Supreme Court opinions in Smith,
the en banc opinion in Bailey does not rely significantly on either
interpretive approaches based on Congressional purpose inferred from
legislative history69 or policy arguments.70
The en banc opinion made short work of applying its new definition to
the facts before it. Bailey's conviction was affirmed because "the jury was
entitled to conclude that Bailey had put the gun into the car not for some
unrelated purpose but because he was keeping drugs there; that alone
establishes that the gun was used in relation to Bailey's drug trafficking
offense."'" Robinson's conviction was reinstated because the jury could
66. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
67. 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 540.
69. There is a one paragraph reference to legislative history invoked to support the court's
interpretation, not of "use or carry," but of "in relation to a drug trafficking crime" in the firearms
penalty. 36 F.3d at 116.
70. The only real policy argument advanced was that the en banc approach was superior to the
prior open-ended test in the District of Columbia Circuit because it would provide a "bright line"
standard that would decrease inconsistent results and excessive second-guessing of jury decisions. Id.
at 117. Presumably, any equally simple test would have the same virtues, including the interpretation
proposed by Judge Williams' dissent. Id. at 120 (Williams, J., dissenting).
71. 36 F.3d at 117-118. Neither the panel decision nor the en banc majority opinion discuss
whether Bailey was also "carrying" the gun during and in relation to his drug crime, although he was
convicted of "using or carrying" a firearm. In his dissent from the en banc opinion, Judge Williams
argues that Bailey's transportation of the gun in his car trunk cannot be termed "carrying" the gun,
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infer "that Robinson placed or kept the gun in the same location as the
drugs in order to protect her possession of the drugs... [and thus] used
the gun in relation to the drug trafficking offense."72
Two differing dissents were filed opposing the en banc opinion. Judge
Williams wrote a lengthy dissent, joined by Judges Silberman and Buckley,
arguing that use must be "understood to require real activity' ' 3 and not
"simply possession with a floating intent to use."7 4 He would have
reversed both convictions. Judge Wald wrote a shorter dissent, essentially
supporting a continued "open-ended approach" that would have reversed
only Robinson's conviction.75
Three of the justices who will decide the Bailey and Robinson cases have
already written opinions as circuit court judges about the meaning of "use
or carry" in the firearm penalty: Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer. Although
Justice Kennedy's opinion in the Stewart case' is cited in the en banc
Bailey opinion as an important source for its reasoning, as we discuss
below, 7 7 then-Judge Kennedy was not only interpreting an earlier version
of the statute, he was also clearly interpreting the meaning of carry, not
use.
Then-Judge Thomas ruled in United States v. Long78 that the evidence
against the defendant was insufficient to support his conviction for "using"
a firearm where the government failed to prove that Long even possessed
the firearm found at the scene of the drug trafficking crime. 79 The Long
decision thus does not clearly indicate how Justice Thomas would apply
use afirearm to the Bailey and Robinson facts where possession is proven.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in United States v. McFadden"0 can
be read as a good indication of how he will approach the Bailey and
Robinson cases. The facts in McFadden were very similar to the Robinson
because there was no evidence that he had immediate access to it while committing a drug offense. Id.
at 125. The government, in its Supreme Court brief, asks the Court to remand the cases to the court of
appeals for consideration of the "carry" issue if the Court decides for petitioners on the "use" issue.
Bnef for the United States at 44 n.19, 63 U.S.L.W. 3780 (1995) (Nos. 94-7448, 94-7492).
72. Id. at 118.
73. Id. at 126.
74. Id. at 121.
75, Id. at 120. Apparently she differentiated between the two cases on the basis that Bailey had
more "ready access" to his gun than did Robinson.
76. 779 F.2d 538.
77. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
78. 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990).
79, Id. at 1578.
80. 13 F.3d 463, 466-71 (1st Cir. 1994).
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case. McFadden was charged with using a firearm during and in relation to
the crime of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute."' The only
evidence that he "used" a firearm was that marked money from sales to
undercover officers was found under McFadden's mattress along with an
unloaded shotgun; no ammunition was found in the apartment.12 Then-
Chief Judge Breyer dissented from the majority opinion that applied the
following test: "[M]ere presence of arms for protection of drugs for sale is
present use," a "use" the majority described as the "maintenance of a
fortress." 3
Breyer's long and thoughtful dissent is particularly noteworthy because
it draws upon his unusual expertise in the area of criminal sentencing: first
as chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 4 and then, after
becoming a federal appellate judge, as a member of the United States
Sentencing Commission that drafted the Sentencing Guidelines." His
dissent provides a strong policy argument against the type of interpretation
represented by both the McFadden and Bailey majority opinions, that this
very broad interpretation of use results in a very rigid sentencing system
which is inconsistent with the Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines
provide a lower sentence enhancement if a convicted defendant possessed
a firearm during a drug trafficking offense than if the firearm was used,
86
defining firearm use in a way that clearly requires that the firearm was
either discharged or employed as a weapon beyond mere brandishment or
display. 7 It is not entirely clear from his dissent, though, how exactly he
would interpret use afirearm, a problem he frankly admits: "I confess that
it is easier to see the need to distinguish (drug-crime-related) 'use' from
'possession' than it is to explain just how to make the* distinction."8 He
appears to end up with a position close to Judge Wald's dissent in Bailey,
an open-ended approach where a finding of firearms use might turn on such
factors as whether the gun was loaded, the amount of drugs possessed, and
81. Id. at 464.
82. Id. at 465.
83. Id.
84. See David Margolick, Man in the News: The Supreme Court; Scholarly Consensus Builder:
Stephen Gerald Breyer, N.Y. TIMs, May 14, 1994, at Al.
85. Id.
86. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (drug trafficking).
87. U.S.S.G. § 1BI.1, crat. l(g) (1995) (defining "otherwise used" with reference to a firearm).
88. 13 F.3d at 468.
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the presence of other guns.89
If the division of the Justices in the Smith case were taken as a basis for
predicting votes in the Bailey and Robinson cases, then one might assume
that the three dissenting Justices who favored a "narrow" interpretation in
Smith (Scalia, Souter and Stevens) would be likely to opt for a narrow
interpretation in these cases. Of the six Justices in the Smith majority, only
four remain on the bench: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor and Thomas. If Justice Breyer's vote is predicted, based on
McFadden, to be on the side of a narrow interpretation, the Court would
be split four to four with Justice Ginsburg the key vote. However, as we
discuss below,9" the interpretive issue in Smith is linguistically quite
different from that presented in Bailey and Robinson, which provides one
of many salient reasons for not attempting to predict the outcome of these
two apparently very difficult cases.
III. LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
A. Methodology
The linguistic question before us is whether a statute which imposes a
mandatory prison sentence on any person who "uses or carries a firearm"
"during and in relation to" a "drug-trafficking crime" should be understood
as applying to cases where a firearm was stored in a place which also
contained "drugs, drug paraphernalia or drug proceeds," even though the
defendants (as in Bailey and Robinson) were not observed to handle or
manipulate the firearm or even to have the firearm on their person. Because
the holdings in both Bailey and Robinson are based on the "use" branch of
the "uses or carries" provision in section 924(c)(1), the emphasis in this
discussion is on the word "use."
Because Bailey, Robinson, and related decisions make much of
"common parlance" and the "ordinary use of the English language," the
approach we take here is to seek information about how the everyday
principles of interpreting these words, in these contexts, on the part of
ordinary users of the English language, can shed light on the question
89. Id. If the issue were whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer that a firearm
was "actually used" at some point in relation to drug trafficking, reliance on such factors as "the amount
of drugs present" would make more sense. It is more difficult to understand how the combination of
all these varying factors determines whether the firearm was "used" in some sense other than
conventional "active use."
90. See infra Section III (C).
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before us. The methods we employ are those of standard linguistic analysis.
These include, in part, an examination of the occurrence of particular
linguistic forms (in our case the word "use") in different contexts, by, for
example, exploring electronic data bases containing a large number of texts,
sorting the examples according to features of context, and considering
native speaker judgments on the interpretation of those instances;
performing changes in expressions using the word and seeking native
speaker judgments on the results of those changes; and (in the case of
so-called "negative evidence") seeking native-speaker agreement on the
unacceptability of invented uses of the word.
An example of negative evidence might be this: From the results of our
examination of "use a firearm" in various contexts we may acquire the
belief that in its central meaning it is equivalent to 'discharge the firearm.'
To counter this, we would point out that an appropriately situated utterance
of "I accidentally discharged the gun (when I was showing it to my
nephew)" could not be paraphrased as "I accidentally used the gun." Such
negative evidence obviously does not appear in the form of direct
observations that we can make about the language in use: We need to
notice that native speakers of the language agree that this would not be an
appropriate utterance for such a situation.
Inmany cases the judgments we depend on are obvious enough not to
need support from speaker surveys or the like. However, in some cases
linguists choose to survey users to verify assertions about the issues of
meaning or usage in question.9 In this analysis, though, we are restricting
ourselves to conclusions that can be supported by reference to positive
evidence from our textual searches and negative evidence that we believe
is self-evident to native speakers. We have searched three sets of texts: (1)
British newspaper articles (a very large data set) (2) selected American
newspaper articles (a much smaller set used primarily as a control against
possible, but unlikely, dialect differences between British and American
practices about expressions involving "use"; and (3) the entire text of Title
18 of the United States Code, which includes most federal criminal law.92
91. See, eg., Cunningham et al., supra note 4, at 1599-1613 (analyzing the meaning of
"enterprise").
92. The first data set we used was the British National Corpus, a sample of contemporary British
English of approximately one hundred million words, created by a consortium of publishers and
research institutions in Britain. Fillmore had ready access to this unusually large data base because of
his current participation in major research projects in computational lexicography centered in Europe.
See, e.g., Charles J. Fillmore & B.T.S. Atkins, Starting Where the Dictionaries Stop: The Challenge for
Computational Lexicography, in COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE LEXICON 349 (B.T.S. Atkins
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The kinds of expressions we will concern ourselves with here are those
in which the verb "use" has as its direct object a word or phrase designat-
ing a firearm.93 The occurrence of "use" with an expression designating
a firearm will be referred to in what follows as "use [a firearm]" where the
bracketed phrase "[a firearm]" will refer to any noun phrase designating a
type of firearm, e.g., "his rifle", "a shotgun".
B. The Generality of the Verb "Use"
Many verbs stand for types of events or activities that can be character-
ized in fairly precise and complete ways. If an English sentence attributes
to some person an action such as chewing, groveling, alphabetizing,
exhaling, or the like, we could hire an actor to carry out such activities, and
we could decide without any difficulty whether that actor's activities were
of the sort represented by the sentence's main verb. There are other simple
verbs that identify activities that cannot be acted out, such as appreciating,
grieving, doubting, etc., but we know from our own experiences what sorts
of activities these are.
But in addition to these, there are also verbs that provide no specifics on
the nature of an activity, offering instead an evaluation or interpretation of
an activity. If we read that Jones "failed" or "succeeded," or that he "risked
his inheritance," we find that the words "fail," "succeed," and "risk" tell us
& A. Zampoli eds., 1994). Through colleagues at the Oxford University Press, Fillmore received by
electronic mail a collection of sentences from the corpus that contained the word use and one or more
of the words gun, weapon, firearm, rifle, pistol, or shotgun. This collection was pared down by
eliminating those sentences in which the word use had no grammatical connection with the firearm
name,
The second data set was created by Cunningham in consultation with Fillmore using the NEXIS data
base of American newspapers maintained by Mead Data Central. Restricting the search to the New York
Times, Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times for the period of June 2 - June 9, 1995, he searched
for segments containing any variation of use within seven words of either gun orfirearm. This search
generated twenty-eight examples.
The third data set was created by Timothy Willoughby under Cunningham's supervision from the
full text of Title 18 contained in the LEXIS data base maintained by Mead Data Central. After a number
of pre-test searches, the final set was generated by searching for segments containing variations of use
either (a) within fifteen words of variations of carry or possess or (b) within fifteen words offlrearm,
weapon, explosive, knife or gun. This search yielded 149 examples which were then reviewed by
Cunningham individually, who reduced the examples to the smaller final set which he then forwarded
to Fillmore.
93. The relation we speak of here as holding between "use" and its direct object will stand as an
abbreviation for phrases that are properly so described (e.g., "he used his gun"), as well as passive
sentences with the firearm expressed as the subject (e.g., "a gun was used in the crime") and phrases
in which the noun "use" is followed by a prepositional phrase beginning with "of' (e.g., "his crime
involved the use of a gun.').
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nothing about what Jones actually did; they merely tell us that, whatever
it was, it did or did not count as achieving Jones' goal, in the case of
"succeeded" and "failed," or, in the case of "risked his inheritance," it
created a probability that Jones's inheritance might be endangered. In order
for sentences containing such verbs to be fully intelligible, further
information must be provided: Jones failed to win my vote; Jones
succeeded in getting the audience's attention; Jones risked his inheritance
by insulting his grandfather. The verb "use" is similar to the verbs in this
latter group, in demanding some sort of completion to be more fully
informative, but unlike them, it points to an enabling circumstance rather
than an evaluation or interpretation of an event. The phrase "enabling
circumstance" is deliberately vague, since what is intended includes a vast
range of relations between actors and their activities: One can use the side
roads to avoid the rush hour traffic; one can use Latin in one's research;
one can use a coat hanger to break into a car, and so on. If we hear about
some event only that "Jones used a rock," we know nothing about what
Jones did, only that, in doing what he did, a rock was put to some
unspecified instrumental service. The sentence "I used a rock" is not
informative enough to be taken as a cooperative response to the simple
request, "Tell me something you did today." The interviewer would have
to ask another question to get any idea what kind of activity the other was
engaged in.
Expressions of the form "W used X" express an idea more fully stated
in the form "W used X as Y to do Z." X served an instrumental function,
Y, in some purposeful activity, Z, in which X was engaged. The nature of
that primary activity (Z) needs to be known before we can understand the
full message of a "W uses X" utterance.94 Suppose we hear that the
sentence "They used a rock" has been uttered in connection with what
some boys did. This sentence is uninformative if it has no contextual
support: We learn from it nothing about the kind of activity the rock played
a part in. Such a sentence can only be understood if it is a part of a larger
context which identifies Z, or which, by identifying Y, invites reasonable
inferences about the nature of Z. One such context could be a conversation
94. The two phrases "as Y to do Z" in combination would provide the kind of "purpose
parameter" referenced in Michael Geis' analysis of the firearms statute. Michael Geis, The Meaning of
"Meaning" in the Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1125 (1995). We consider Geis' analysis essentially
consistent with our own, although it differs somewhat in terminology and focus. See also Lawrence M.
Solan, Judicial Decisions and LinguisticAnalysis: Is There a Linguist in the Court, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1069 (1995) (discussing Smith in terms of semantic prototype theory).
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partner's question about how the boys managed to put the wounded animal
out of its misery (they used a rock); a second context might be a concern
about how they kept the cabin door from blowing shut (they used a rock);
a third might be a question about how they dealt with the fact that there
were not any picnic tables in that part of the park (they used a rock). The
expression is broad enough to include a case in which the rock was directly
manipulated in an event which immediately brought about a result (killing
the animal); a case in which the rock was put in place against the
possibility that something would happen (a gust of wind blowing against
the door); and a case in which the rock simply afforded certain features
(flatness or stability) which the boys could take advantage of.
Information about the primary activity, Z, can be provided outside of the
actual sentence in which "use" occurs, or it can be provided as a part of
that same sentence. For example, direct or indirect information about Z can
appear in a phrase that is grammatically subordinated to the "use" phrase,
as in the following examples where phrases beginning with "to", "as" and
"for" modify "used a rock."
"We used a rock to kill the porcupine."
"We used a rock as a doorstop."
"We used a rock for a picnic table."
Alternatively, information about the use of the instrument can be subordi-
nated to a clause that identifies the primary activity.
"We killed the animal using a rock."
"We propped the door open by using a large rock."
In many cases, the same instrumental role can be signalled by a
with-phrase: The phrase "with a rock" would communicate the same
information in the above two sentences.
Even these expanded sentences do not tell us directly what was actually
done with the rock; much is still left to inference. For the three situations
we have just posited, we are likely to imagine that the animal was killed
by striking it with the rock, that the door was propped open by placing the
rock on the floor next to the (partially) open door to prevent it from
moving into the jamb, or that a large and probably flat rock provided a
surface for laying out a picnic lunch. Our visualization of each such scene
is aided by our experience with rocks and our knowledge of their properties
and potentials, and by our familiarity with the activities and intentions of
human beings.
In short, we are able to understand a sentence that contains the verb
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"use" only if we have further information, directly or indirectly, about what
is going on. It is for this reason that we believe that dictionary definitions
of "use" are particularly unhelpful. As Michael Geis points out in his essay,
definitions of the sort quoted by the Smith court are circular: simply
substituting less familiar terms like "employ" or "avail oneself of' for
"use" when these less familiar words are then themselves defined in terms
of "use."95
C. Interpreting the Instrumental Role of the Direct Object
In Smith v. United States, Justice O'Connor relies on the generality of
the verb use in concluding that use afirearm can be interpreted to include
using a gun as an item of barter to acquire cocaine: "[O]ne can use a
firearm in a number of ways."9 However, the nature of firearm as an
artifact with a specific function (to discharge a projectile with sufficient
force to wound or kill), combined with the absence in the statute of an
accompanying "as" phrase invites the interpretation offered by Justice
Scalia in dissent,97 despite the generality of use out of context.
The noun "rock" used in the earlier examples does not designate an
object that was manufactured for any specific purpose. Therefore, a "use"
sentence with a rock named as the instrument needs contextual support for
clarifying the function the rock has in the activity in which it is being used.
But some nouns designate artifacts that are produced specifically for certain
purposes ("typewriter," "flashlight," "gun," etc.), and when these nouns
appear as direct objects of "use," even without the sorts of contextual
support mentioned above, strong inferences are invited about the agent's
(i.e., W's) relation to the artifact (X) in carrying out activity Z.
"Do you use a typewriter in your work?"
"We may need to use a flashlight."
"I have never used this gun."
The natural inferences we derive from these sentences have to do with
the way in which the agent W takes advantages of those properties which
have to do with the purpose of the artifact X; we still need more informa-
tion to know exactly what activity Z is. Perhaps we need a flashlight to
find our way out of a cave. Again, to understand a "use" sentence fully, we
have to have some idea of the way in which X served an enabling function
95. Geis, supra note 94, at 1133-43.
96. 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2055 (1993).
97. Id. at 2061 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in W's carrying out activity Z.
When the object of "use" (X) is an artifact manufactured for a specific
purpose, we can say that the "default" interpretation of "use X" will be to
engage X in the function for which it was created. By "default interpreta-
tion" we mean the interpretation a speaker will "fall back on" in the
absence of additional information either within the utterance itself or
inferable from the circumstances of the utterance. (If W used X [a gun] as
a X [gun] to do Z, the "as a.. . " specification can drop out, yielding the
default interpretation.) Thus, if we hear somebody say, "I hope I never have
to use this gun," we are most likely to assume that the person is speaking
about using it for its manufactured purpose, which is to propel a projectile
with a force that would allow it to do bodily injury to a living being. This
"default interpretation" then will be to fire or discharge the gun with such
an intention. If the phrase "used a gun" was to be used to describe an
occasion when a gun was placed on papers to prevent them from blowing
away, a speaker would reasonably assume that the utterance would have
been something like, "He used a gun as a paperweight" to signal that the
default interpretation was not applicable.
The disagreement between Justices O'Connor and Scalia in Smith v.
United States thus can be analyzed as a dispute over whether the interpreta-
tion of the instrumental role element of use a firearm should be limited to
the default interpretation (Justice Scalia's position),9 8 or whether the
absence of an explicit role element instead should indicate a relatively
unbounded interpretation of possible instrumental functions, including the
rather unusual function of firearm as unit of exchange in barter.99
In our newspaper data set we found one example of a firearm being used
other than as a firearm:
"used his shotgun as a club to try to put an injured porcupine out of its
misery."'"
The "as a club" phrase serves to notify the reader that the default
interpretation of instrumental function is not applicable. The Title 18 corpus
also shows that "as a Y" appears in an expression in order to negate the
inference of the inherent function:
"The term "destructive device" shall not include any device which is neither
98. Id. at 2062-2063.
99. Id. at 2054-2055 (Justice O'Connor's position).
100. See infra Appendix One.
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designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon; any device, although originally
designed for use as a weapon, which is redesigned for use as a signaling,
pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety, or similar device... "10
We also found several examples where accompanying phrases appear in
order to indicate that "use a firearm" includes activities other than
discharge, although still related to the inherent weapon function:
Example One: " ... if a firearm was brandished, discharged, or
otherwise used as a weapon ... .""02 The critical surrounding language
here includes the preceding word "otherwise" and the following phrase "as
a weapon": The expression covers ways of using a firearm "as a weapon"
other than firing it off - pistol whipping someone, for example, or striking
someone with the butt of a rifle. Because the phrase beginning with
"otherwise" follows the word "discharged", the interpretation is that
discharging a firearm is one way of using a firearm as a weapon. 3
Example Two: "[T]he defendant used a firearm or knowingly directed,
advised, authorized, or assisted another to use a firearm to threaten,
intimidate, assault, or injure a person."' ' Here the purpose phrase
beginning with "to threaten... " shows a fuller range of uses to which a
firearm can be put in order to guarantee that a victim's resistance will be
unavailing.
Thus the surrounding language, and whatever purposes, ongoing
activities, or contrasts it introduces, help to tune the interpretation we can
give to a phrase like "use [a firearm]." It may, for example, indicate the
instrumental role, Y, even if it is not explicitly stated. The absence of such
surrounding language, in particular the conventional signal "as a ... "
invites the interpretation favored by Justice Scalia that use afirearm refers
only to use as a weapon."'5
101. 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(D) (1988 & Supp. 1995) (defining "firearms use" for purposes of
sentencing classification).
103. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1995) (defining "assault with intent to commit
rape" as "engaging in physical contact with another person or using or brandishing a weapon against
another person.. . .") Here "using" is distinguished from "brandishing."
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(d)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1995) (aggravating factors to be considered in
determining whether sentence of death is justified).
105. 113 S. Ct. at 2062 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia says that "[tfo use an instrumentality
ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose" and gives as his example his opinion on the most
natural interpretation one could give to the question, "Do you use a cane?", suggesting that everybody
would understand the speaker as asking if the addressee walks with the help of a walking stick. Id. at
2061. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, responds to this argument by claiming that "to use
Y" is not so limited: She refers to expressions about "using a cane" in administering punishment. She
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D. The Difference Between Eventive and Designative Interpretations
The en bane opinion in Bailey invokes the "expansive" interpretation of
use a firearm in Smith as authority for creating its own "expansive"
interpretation."t 6 However, our analysis indicates that the Smith and
Bailey cases present interpretive issues quite different in kind. The clue to
identifying how very different the en bane Bailey interpretation is in
"expansiveness" from the Smith decision is the following "ordinary
language" example that is the keystone of the Bailey opinion:
"[A] gun placed in a drawer beside one's bed for fear of an intruder would,
in common parlance, be a gun 'used' for domestic protection." 7
If this piece of "common parlance" is paraphrased from the passive to
active form, it would appear as: "Ron used a gun for domestic protection."
We notice how different this expression is than any of the use a firearm
examples discussed above when we try to restate it in the form: W used X
as Y to do Z. It seems simple enough to say that Ron used the gun as a
gun [for domestic protection], but it becomes difficult to identify an activity
Z for which the gun served an instrumental role. As long as the gun rests
in the bedside drawer, Ron has not done anything with the gun; no specific
event has occurred for which the gun was an instrumentality. (Even if the
initial act of placing the gun in the drawer is viewed as an event, that is an
act done to the gun, not by means of the gun.)
We looked through our newspaper and legal sets for other examples of
use a firearm similar to the en bane example in lacking an activity Z and
found such expressions in both sets. In the newspaper corpus, the
expressions were all marked by an accompanying "for" phrase:
points out that, far from being an unusual usage, this usage is so salient that it has led to the word
"caning" to refer to just such a punishment. She implies that the question "Do you use a cane?" can
suggest very different uses for the same "instrumentality." Id. at 2055. The flaw in the majority's
example is that it assumes that these two expressions about "canes" speak of different uses of the same
kind of object. The "cane" that is used in punishment is not the same sort of object as the "cane" that
is used for support in walking. The CoLLNs ENGLISH DICIONARY, gives as one of the separately
numbered senses of "cane" the following: "5. a flexible rod with which to administer a beating as a
punishment, as to schoolboys." COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY 235 (3d ed. 1991). A "cane" of this type
could not easily keep an unsteady person from toppling. Also, a British schoolmaster authorized to "use
the cane" for punishing misbehaving schoolboys would undoubtedly be in for severe punishment
himself if he chose to use a walking stick on the hands or backsides of his charges. The two instruments
have different properties because they are created for different purposes.
106. United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d at 114 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
107. Id.
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use a gun for personal protection;
use guns for law enforcement or crime prevention;
use guns for protection." 8
In Title 18 we found that the expressions were also marked by the
preposition "for," although use was most often part of a for phrase, in
which case there was another accompanying for, of, or in:1°9
intends to use solelyfor sporting, recreational or cultural purposes"0
loan ... for temporary usefor lawful sporting purposes"'
intended for the personal use of such member"2
imported... for the use of the United States"'
for use in connection with his official duty"4
for use in a program approved by a school"
is for use in connection with competition or trainingt" 6
Like the example posed by the en banc Bailey opinion, all of the above
expressions could refer to situations where no event has yet taken place in
which the firearm played an instrumental role.' 17
If use a firearm does not indicate in such expressions a relationship
between an agent (W), instrument (X) and an activity (Z), what kind of
interpretation is invited? What all these expressions seem to have in
common is that they designate the firearm to a particular purpose (personal
protection, law enforcement, sporting, official duty, school program,
competition or training purposes) or, in the Title 18 set, to a particular
agent (the United States, personal use of such member). However, the
expressions do not seem to convey much information beyond that
108. See infra Appendix One.
109. For the full statutory context of each phrase, see infra Appendix One.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(4)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(iv) (1988 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
117. In looking at expressions from the newspaper corpus usingfor, we distinguish "use a gun for
personal protection" from expressions like "use guns for hunting," because the latter does indicate a
particular activity (hunting), although possibly in a generalized iterative way rather than a specific event.
See infra Appendix One. Evidence for this distinction is the peculiarity of the following expression:
John used that gun for hunting although he never took it out of the drawer.
as compared with
John used that gun for domestic protection although he never took it out of the drawer.
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designation.
The en bane Bailey opinion thus prompts us to recognize two very
different interpretations of a phrase like use afirearm. For the first type of
interpretation, a sentence like "Jones used a gun in self-defense," a reader
would understand that a specific event took place in which the gun played
an instrumental role. We refer to this as an "eventive" interpretation of the
sentence: Using the gun was a specific time-bound act. In contrast, a
sentence like "John used a gun for domestic protection" easily leads to an
interpretation that does not bring to mind a specific event, but rather covers
a situation in which Jones was merely prepared to protect his home by
keeping a gun available." 8 We term this second type of interpretation as
"designative": The gun was designated as having a particular function in
Jones' household. 119
Application of this distinction reveals several interesting patterns in the
legal discourse of Title 18. First, all of the appearances of use a firearm
that invite a designative interpretation are exceptions to legal liability, and
in particular, exceptions to liability based on possession of a firearm. Apart
from the dubious example of § 924(c) itself, we could find no provision in
Title 18 where a designative interpretation of use is the basis for imposing
criminal liability.
Second, several situations that could perhaps be described by designative
use are described instead with the verb possess. Subsection 922(x) generally
prohibits sale or transfer of a handgun or ammunition to a juvenile, and
lists a number of exceptions. One exception could easily have been stated
with designative use, excepting handguns "used for ranching or farming,"
118. Of course, it is also possible to give this sentence an eventive interpretation, as referring to
a specific occasion in which John used the gun to wound a burglar.
119. Readers familiar with the literature on aspect in semantics may wonder whether we are
classifying the verb use as having two distinct senses, marked by different aspect: + eventive and -
eventlve (or stative). Although we considered this possibility briefly during our analysis, comments by
Jeffrey Kaplan, Georgia Green and Judith Levi and consultation with aspect specialists Man Olsen and
Hana Filip confirmed our doubts about such a classification. Consistent with our conclusions about the
generality of use out of context, we do not suggest that the verb itself is marked for aspect, in contrast
to such well known examples as learn (eventive) versus know (stative). We have borrowed the basic
concept, eventive, as a convenient description for interpretations of certain types of sentences in which
use appears. However, the contrasting interpretation of sentences of the use for domesticprotection type
is not so readily described as the opposite of eventive (Le., stative). Therefore, we have coined the term
"designative," which does not have a corresponding term of art in aspectual semantics. In the discussion
that follows, when we sometimes for the sake of brevity refer to eventive use or designative use, we
do not mean to indicate that the verb itself has these two distinct senses. Rather we are referring to two
different types of interpretations that can be given to expressions containing use.
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but note the actual wording of the exception:
[W]ith respect to ranching or fanning activities as described in clause (i), a
juvenile may possess and use a handgun or ammunition with the prior written
approval of the juvenile's parent.. .120
In this provision Congress apparently wanted to reserve use for an eventive
meaning, to indicate that the juvenile could even discharge the handgun
(and not just have "available for use," i.e, "possess ... for ranching or
farming activities.").
Another exception in subsection 922(x) is even more intriguing because
it is the only provision we found in Title 18 that invites the phrase "gun
used for domestic protection," yet here Congress avoided use altogether,
speaking only of "possession":
This subsection does not apply to-. . . (D) the possession of a handgun or
ammunition by a juvenile taken in defense of the juvenile or other persons
against an intruder into the residence of the juvenile or a residence in which
the juvenile is an invited guest.12'
The distinction between eventive and designative interpretations of use
accurately, and more precisely, describes the linguistic intuitions a number
of judges have tried to articulate in their opinions. For example, Judge
Williams, in his dissent to the en banc Bailey opinion, asserts that "'use'
in ordinary language normally implies activity" (i.e., eventive) in contrast
to the majority's definition as "possession with a contingent intent to use"
(i.e., designative). However, Judge Williams treats the en banc interpre-
tation as if it were a distortion of the ordinary meaning of use, saying that
the majority "diluted"'' its meaning. Thus, his dissent fails to meet
squarely the majority's most plausible point, that use in ordinary language
does sometimes indicate possession without activity, as in "used for
domestic protection."' 24 The issue is not whether the Bailey majority
"diluted" the meaning of use, but rather, whether the interpretation it
selected, appropriate in some contexts, is plausible in the particular
120. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(3)(ii)(II) (1988 & Supp. 1995).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(3)(D) (1988 & Supp. 1995).
122. 36 F.3d 106, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Justice Breyer, in his thoughtful McFadden dissent, did seem to recognize that use could be
given an interpretation that is very close to merely possess, and also recognized that the distinction,
although recognizable, was difficult to articulate. United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 467 (Breyer,
CJ., dissenting). See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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statutory context within which use appears.
Likewise, Astor v. Merritt,'25 the century old Supreme Court decision
about the clothing import duty cited in the en banc Bailey opinion, clearly
indicates that the Court was selecting a designative interpretation of use
clothing:
If a person residing in the United States should purchase wearing apparel
here, in a condition ready for immediate wear without further manufacture,
intended for his own use or wear, ... no one would hesitate to say that such
wearing apparel was 'in actual use' by such person, even though some of it
might not have been actually put on or applied to its proper personal use ....
An article of wearing apparel, bought for use, and appropriated and set apart
to be used, by being placed in with, and as a part of, what is called a
person's wardrobe, is, in common parlance, in use, in actual use, in present
use, in real use, as well before it is worn as while it is being worn or
afterwards.'26
The Astor court was interpreting the following statutory provision:
The importation of the following articles shall be exempt from duty: ...
Wearing apparel in actual use, and other personal effects, (not merchandise,)
.. of persons arriving in the United States. But this exemption shall not be
construed to -include machinery, or other articles imported for use in any
manufacturing establishment, or for sale.'27
The interpretation given by the Court would fit easily if the statutory
language was "wearing apparel for personal use," a formulation that clearly
invites a designative interpretation as does the language of the last sentence
in the provision excluding from the exemption articles imported "for
sale."'28
Unfortunately, the Astor opinion seems to conflate designative and
eventive interpretations of use with its problematic assertion about everyday
language: "bought for [personal] use ... is, in common parlance ...
[synonymous with] in actual use."' 29 This assertion is inconsistent with
normal linguistic intuition that the combination of "actual" with "use"
functions precisely to clarify that more than designative use is involved, as
125. 111 U.S. 202 (1884).
126. Id. at 213 (emphasis added), quoted in Bailey, 36 F.3d at 114-15.
127. 18 Stat. 482, 489 (1878) (emphasis added), quoted in Astor, 11 U.S. at 203.
128. The Court was thus interpreting use in the import duty statute as, for example, use functions
in 18 U.S.C. § 925(s)(1) to create an exception to the firearms importation prohibition for "any firearm
imported... for the use of the United States." See supra note 113 and accompanying text
129. 111 U.S. at 213.
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the following examples illustrate:
Take a look at this fine fur coat I bought in England.
Have you actually used it?
No, I'm waiting until the first snowfall.
This is the gun I use for domestic protection.
Have you actually used it?
No, thank God, I've never had to use it.
Despite its asserted reliance on "common parlance," the Astor court was
apparently trumping the textual language with the inferred purpose of the
provision, to allow clothing purchased abroad for personal use to be
imported free of duty, 3° but the Court's failure to acknowledge it was
rejecting ordinary meaning 3' in favor of some other principle of interpre-
tation undermines the credibility of its opinion and creates a mischievous
precedent that obscures the distinction between eventive and designative
interpretations of use depending on context.
The question then becomes whether the particular textual context of use
a firearm in the firearms penalty makes it plausible to interpret use as
designative, thus, not necessarily implying a time-bound event for which
the firearm played an instrumental role.
Use afirearm within the first sentence of the firearms penalty invites an
eventive, not a designative interpretation. The accompanying prepositional
phrase in the firearms penalty is not afor phrase but rather "during and in
relation to . . .. "32 In relation to is so deliberately133 vague as to offer
130. The Court said that it was seeking an interpretation that, "while it comports with the ordinary
habits of passengers and travellers, will not open the door for fraud." Ill U.S. at 214. One might
suspect, though, that the intent of Congress in selecting the phrase "in actual use" was precisely to
address the problem Mr. Astor presented to the customs inspector. If the test was whether the owner
of the clothing intended them for personal use, a difficult burden would be placed on the inspector to
disprove the owner's stated intent. On the other hand, if the test was whether the clothing had actually
been worn by the owner, the inspector could look for objective evidence, and if the clothing had
obviously been "actually used," its potential value for resale in the United States would be greatly
diminished. (This, of course, is precisely what is meant by "used clothing." Had Mr. Astor died before
the onset of winter, his widow might offer his imported fir coat for sale as "never actually used.")
131. Perhaps "common parlance" on this point was different in 1884, but we doubt it.
132. As originally enacted, use afirearm was modified by to commit anyfelony. See infra note 154
and accompanying text. Such a to do something phrase is the standard marker of the eventive
interpretation.
133. As discussed in the en banc Bailey opinion, in 1985 the Reagan administration successfully
opposed a provision in a bill passed by the Senate that would have replaced "carries... in relation to"
with "carries in furtherance of" by arguing that the change would have indicated a more direct
connection between the gun and the predicate offense. United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 116 (D.C.
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little interpretive guidance, but during certainly invites an eventive
interpretation, particularly as combined with "crime of violence." It is only
the fact that the current broad definition of "drug trafficking crime" in the
statute allows the statutory text to be "translated" into an indictment for
"using a firearm ... during and in relation to the crime of possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute" that raises even the possibility of a
designative interpretation.'34 As pointed out in the en bane Bailey
opinion, "[s]ince possession with intent subsequently to distribute is in a
sense a passive crime, it becomes somewhat difficult analytically to
determine how one goes about using a gun in relation to that crime." 35
Because mere possession is not an event or an activity, it is difficult to
construct a sentence with use in an eventive interpretation that applies
readily to fact situations like Bailey and Robinson.3 6 Thus, when the
government attempts to apply the firearms penalty to one particfilar type of
drug trafficking crime, possession, many judges are apparently tempted to
project the "non-eventive" character of that precursor offense back on to
the meaning of use a firearm, motivating them to give use a designative
interpretation.
However that motivation to give use a designative interpretation must
still contend with another contextual feature, one that strongly indicates that
only an eventive interpretation is appropriate: the combination of "uses"
with "carries" connected by "or." The contrast between carrying a firearm
and using a firearm is a familiar and established one and indicates that
"using a gun" is a specific act, one more dangerous than the act of
"carrying a gun." As a matter of ordinary language, "whoever uses or
carries a firearm.., shall be punished," is understood as "whoever uses or
even carries a firearm... shall be punished."
Cir 1994).
134. The legislative history of the firearms penalty raises great doubt as to whether any particular
Congress intended that use afirearm be given a designative interpretation, including the 1988 Congress
that amended the definition of "drug trafficking crime" to include possession. See infra notes 153-85
and accompanying text.
135. 36 F.3d at 116-17 (quoting United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1055).
136. Unlike Bailey, Robinson was charged with distribution (to the undercover officer) as well as
possession of cocaine (found in the closet). United States v. Robinson, 997 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir.
1993). However, the en bane opinion only refers to her crime of possession in applying its new rule
to her facts. 36 F.3d at 118. According to Robinson's brief, the firearms penalty charge (Count V of
the indictment) was based only on the precursor crime of possession (Count I1) and not the crime of
distributing cocaine to the undercover officer the previous day (Count I). Brief for Petitioner, supra note
43, at 5.
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Our review of newspaper examples 37 and Title 18 ' confirms this
common sense impression. The clearest example is the following:
Muggers here carry guns and use them! 39
The meaning of this phrase changes, and becomes puzzling or comical if
the order of "carry" and "use" are reversed.
Muggers here use guns and carry them!
If we transfer this example into the terms of the Bailey case, one can
readily see from the peculiarity of the last of the three following sentences,
A(3), why the en banc "definition" defies semantic common sense when
cuse" appears as "use or carry."
A(1) Roland Bailey uses a gun to protect his drug trafficking, putting it in
his car trunk whenever he leaves to make a sale.
A(2) Jack Bailey tucks a pistol under his belt whenever he leaves to make
a drug sale.
A(3) Unlike his brother Roland, Jack does not just use his gun; he carries
it!
It seems clear as a matter of ordinary language that adding "or carries"
expands criminal liability from the obvious hazards caused by using a gun
(as a weapon) to the more subtle dangers created by carrying a gun.
Section 924 itself contains textual evidence that "use or carry" is
interpreted as fitting into a hierarchy of danger with "discharge" at one end
and "possess" at the other. Subsection 924(a)(5)(B)(ii) provides criminal
penalties for any adult who transfers a handgun to a juvenile with
knowledge that the juvenile "intended to carry or otherwise possess or
discharge or otherwise use the handgun" in the commission of a crime of
violence. 4  This subsection clearly indicates the following hierarchy of
dangers associated with transferring a gun to a juvenile:
(1) discharge
(2) or otherwise use
137. See infra Appendix Two. Appendix Two contains examples from current British news sources,
mainly because the British corpus materials were easily available to us, but the ease with which
American readers understand these recurring contrasts between "use a gun" and "carry a gun" indicates
that there is little reason to believe that American English and British English differ in respect to these
uses.
138. See infra Appendix Three.
139. For similar examples, see infra Appendix Two.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1994).
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(3) carry
(4) or otherwise possess 4'
The federal sentencing guidelines,142 promulgated pursuant to Congres-
sional authorization, 143 both reflect a similar hierarchy and treat "carried"
as a type of possession in contrast to "used." Take, for example, the
sentencing enhancement for robbery:
-If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels
-If a firearm was otherwise used,1" increase by 6 levels
-If a firearm was brandished, displayed or possessed increase by 5 levels
145
We now turn to the history of the firearms penalty legislation, both for
additional evidence of whether our linguistic analysis is consistent with the
discourse of the federal firearms law, and for a possible explanation of how
a statute whose text seems to indicate only one interpretation of use a
firearm (the eventive: using a firearm to do something) also permits
application to a situation (using a firearm during and in relation to drug
possession) that invites a different interpretation (the designative: using a
firearm for protection of possessed drugs).
IV. LEGISLATION HISTORY
William Eskridge describes the "new textualism" advocated most
prominently by Justice Scalia as replacing reference to legislative history
with "dictionaries and grammar books ... and the common sense God gave
us.1 14 6 However, our experience on this project indicates that close
attention to the textual language may sometimes make the history of the
141. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5)(B)(ii).
142. 18 U.S.C. app. (1988 & Supp. 1995) (Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
143. 58 U.S.C. § 991 (1988).
144. "Otherwise used, with reference to a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) means that the
conduct did not amount to the discharge of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or
possessing a firearm." Application Instructions, Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § IBI.1 cmt. l(g)
(1995).
145. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) (1995). Both the legislative history and case law interpreting the
firearms penalty clearly indicate that use afirearm includes brandishing and displaying, so that it is
interesting that the Sentencing Guidelines exclude the latter from the definition of "used," apparently
in order to indicate a judgment that mere brandishment of a firearm is no more deserving of severe
punishment than possession. ("Possessed" is not specifically defined in the Guidelines but surely is
intended to include "carried.") Recent legislative attempts to amend section 924(c) seem to reflect a
similar judgment that discharging a firearm should be separated out for greater punishment than mere
carrying of a firearm. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
146. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 669 (1990).
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legislation more, not less relevant. Because the term "legislative history"
is associated with inattention to text in favor of inferred Congressional
purpose, we use the phrase "legislation history" to highlight our focus on
the prior history of the text itself: original language, subsequent amend-
ments, and even failed proposals to amend. This linguistically guided
approach explicates the text by interpreting it as part of a specialized
Congressional discourse taking place over time, not by replacing the text
with committee reports and sponsor speeches as "better evidence" of what
Congress wants the courts to do when applying the law.
Our review of the history of the firearms penalty in Congress from 1968
up to the present confirms our conclusion that use afirearm in that context
should only be given an eventive interpretation. An eventive interpretation
for use a firearm was clearly indicated by the text of the original version
enacted in 1968.147 It took three amendments by three different Congress-
es (1984,141 1986,149 and 198815) to produce the current text, and we
can find no indication that any of those Congresses intended to add a
designative interpretation. However, beginning as early as 1989, Congress
has been very aware that the current text does not readily apply to fact
situations like Bailey and Robinson,' but despite numerous proposed
amendments to address this problem,"5 2 Congress has failed so far to
amend section 924(c) to resolve this concern.
The legislation history also confirms that the patterns of usage we found
in ordinary language (the newspaper examples) and the text of Title 18 are
consistent with the way Congress "talks" about the firearms penalty in the
form of bills, committee reports and floor debates. Perhaps the most
striking evidence that Congressional discourse does not naturally apply use
to fact patterns like Bailey and Robinson is found in the attempted
amendments of the past six years. All of these proposed amendments are
based on adding "possess a firearm" in some form to the firearms penalty;
none of the legislative proposals take the form of defining or "clarifying"
the meaning of use a firearm to include the designative interpretation.
147. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1223. See infra notes 153-66 and
accompanying text.
148. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138 (1984). See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying
text.
149. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 456 (1986). See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
150. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6272, 102 Stat. 4181, 4360 (1988). See infra notes 183-85 and
accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 186-216 and accompanying text.
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A. Original Version
The firearms penalty was first enacted as section 924 of the Gun
Control Act of 1968.' The original provision read as follows:
"(c) Whoever-
(l) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony
which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more
than 10 years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under
this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
for not less than five years nor more than 25 years, and, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of
such person or give him a probationary sentence.""'
The accompanying phrase "to commit any felony" in (c)(1) (which no
longer appears in the firearms penalty) clearly indicates the eventive
interpretation of use. This original subsection 924(c)(1) explicitly states the
form of the eventive interpretation: "W (whoever) uses X (a firearm) to do
Z (commit a felony)." '155 The "to commit" phrase thus indicates the
enabling relationship between the use of a firearm and an event. 56
In this original version, "carrying a firearm" gives rise to criminal
liability only if it was carried "unlawfully," e.g., without a gun permit.
Thus, as originally enacted, the firearms penalty did not apply even if the
firearm was carried during a felony if the felon had a permit to carry the
gun and did not "use[] [the] firearm to commit [the] felony." Thus, reading
the original subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) together provides further evidence
that "use a firearm" could not be given the designative interpretation as
153. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988)). A useful, though incomplete, summary of the legislative history appears in
Note, Thomas A. Clare, Smith v. United States and the Modern Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c):
A Proposal to Amend the Federal Armed Offender Statute, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 815, 823-28
(1994).
154. Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1223.
155. The absence of Y indicates to the reader that the default instrumental role applies, i.e., that X
is used "as a firearm." See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
156. For other examples in Title 18 where use is closely related to an event by an accompanying
"to" phrase, see Appendix Three, infra. Appendix Three also contains provisions indicating a less direct
relationship--"involving the use of a firearm," "acts [which] include the use of weapon," and "used
during the offense"--all of which nonetheless indicate the eventive interpretation of use. Id.
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originally enacted. If a person who obtained a concealed weapon permit
and then carried that weapon hidden under his belt while selling cocaine on
the street corner, said, "I used this gun for drug dealing," one could have
plausibly given use in his utterance a designative interpretation. (His
statement could have been true even if there was never an event in which
he took some action with the gun.) But if use a firearm in the original
(c)(1) was given this designative interpretation, then this street corner dealer
could have been convicted under (c)(1) even though his conduct fell clearly
within the explicit exception written into (c)(2).
It is interesting to note that during the congressional debates leading to
enactment of the original version, one senator spoke in support of the
firearms penalty proposal by paraphrasing the relationship between use and
carry as we did above: "[This law] will make every criminal and would-be
criminal think twice before using or even carrying a firearm."' 57
Ironically, one of the clearest illustrations that the original statute did not
support a designative interpretation of uses a firearm is found in Justice
Kennedy's Stewart decision that the en banc Bailey opinion identifies as the
"seminal" interpretation of the firearms penalty.' The fact pattern in
Stewart is strikingly similar to Bailey. Stewart operated a methamphetamine
laboratory on his business premises and kept various precursor chemicals
and laboratory equipment at his residence.'59 Federal officers arrived at
his residence to execute a search warrant and found Stewart sitting in his
car in front of the house."6t They arrested him and searched the car,
finding an illegal sawed-off "UZI" rifle in the trunk.16t Then-Judge
Kennedy concluded that the jury could infer from this evidence "that
Stewart's possession of the UZI outside his residence was intended to
facilitate the drug operations or secure the premises where contraband and
other evidence were located." 62 This inference led him to express the
157. 114 CONG. REc. S27,144 (1968) (statement of Sen. Murphy) (emphasis added). We learned
of this remark by reading the defendants' Supreme Court brief after we had already formulated the
paraphrase stated earlier. See Brief for Petitioners, at 18 n.7, United States v. Bailey, 63 U.S.L.W. 3780
(1995) (Nos. 94-7448, 94-7492). We mention this statement made on the Senate floor not as typical
legislative history argumentation-as evidence of congressional intent or underlying statutory
purpose-but simply as showing that our intuitions about the ordinary meaning of "use or carry a
firearm" are consistent with the naturally occurring speech of at least one relevant speaker at the time
of original enactment.
158. Bailey, 36 F.3d at 109 (discussing United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1985)).
159. Stewart, 779 F.2d at 539.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 779 F.2d at 539.
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widely-cited "emboldening" rationale for giving the firearms penalty a
broad application:
If the firearm is within the possession or control of a person who commits
an underlying crime as defined by the statute, and the circumstances of the
case show that the firearm facilitated or had a role in the crime, such as
emboldening an actor who had the opportunity or ability to display or
discharge the weapon to protect himself or intimidate others, whether or not
such display or discharge in fact occurred, then there is a violation of the
statute.
163
In quoting this statement from Stewart, however, the en banc Bailey
opinion did not point out that "the statute" referenced in the last line was
the original version."6 The only "violation of the statute" with which
Stewart was charged was the original section 924(c)(2), carrying a firearm
unlawfully during the commission of a felony. Apparently (and understand-
ably) it never occurred to the prosecutors to charge Stewart with violating
the original section 924(c)(1)-that he had used the UZI to commit a
felony--even though under the court's view of the evidence Stewart was
"using the UZI," in the designative sense, to protect his drug opera-
tions. 61
The fact that so many circuit court opinions'66 have relied freely on the
Stewart case as a guide to interpreting use a firearm, even though then-
Judge Kennedy was clearly interpreting carry, not use, suggests that those
courts are failing to attend closely to the actual statutory language even
though claiming their decisions are dictated by the text.
B. 1984 Amendment
Section 1005 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
completely rewrote the firearms penalty, merging the separate "uses" and
"carries" subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) into single complex section (C) 16 7
that read as follows:
163. Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
164. Although the Ninth Circuit decision was filed in 1985, Stewart's crime was committed before
the 1984 amendments.
165. Id. at 539.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Torres-
Medina, 935 F.2d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235, 240 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991).
167. Pub. L. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138-2139 (1984). The current subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3)
were later added to 18 U.S.C. § 924 by the 1986 amendment.
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(c) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence, including a
crime of violence which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed
by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device, for which he may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence, be sentenced
to imprisonment for five years. In the case of his second or subsequent
conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment for ten years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court
shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted
of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed
under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment
including that imposed for the crime of violence in which the firearm was
used or carried. No person sentenced under this subsection shall be eligible
for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed herein."'
According to the Senate report (there was no reference to the firearms
penalty in the House Report)169 this rewrite was primarily motivated by
two goals. First, Congress wanted to make clear, through insertion of the
long parenthetical phrase that begins "including a crime of violence which
provides for an enhanced punishment," o7 that the firearms penalty applies
even when the underlying felony has, as an element, the use of a firearm.
This insertion responded to two Supreme Court decisions holding that a
defendant could not be charged with both the firearms penalty and such a
felony.17 Second, Congress, by deleting the modifier "unlawfully" after
"carries a firearm," eliminated the "registered gun" exception to the crime
of carrying a firearm during commission of a felony. 72 However, at the
same time Congress expanded criminal liability to cover felons who were
carrying a firearm "lawfully" during a crime, it balanced that expansion by
also narrowing liability through changing the precursor crime from "any
felony" to "any crime of violence." '
The replacement in the 1984 text of the accompanying phrase "[uses] to
commit any felony" with the phrase "[uses] during and in relation to a
crime of violence" did move the text away from the most explicit form of
168. Pub. L. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138-2139 (1984).
169. See Clare, supra note 153, at 826, n.76.
170. Pub. L. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138 (1984).
171. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 1, 312-13 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3490-91. The two Supreme Court cases were Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), and
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
172. Pub. L. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138 (1984).
173. Pub. L. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138 (1984).
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the eventive interpretation: W uses X [as Y] to do Z. The new form of the
text-W uses X [as Y] during Z-still refers to an event (a violent crime)
but does not make the causal link between the event and gun use explicit.
Nonetheless, a statement that "John used the gun during the as-
sault\rape\murder [other violent crime]" does not invite an interpretation
that John only designated the gun for potential action during the crime;
rather, the plausible interpretation is that the gun served as an instrumentali-
ty that caused some element of that violent event to take place.'74
We have not found any legislative history that indicates why the 1984
Congress decided to merge what had been separately numbered subsec-
tions--(c)(1) "uses," (c)(2) "carries"--into a single phrase, "uses or
carries." Because, as discussed above, the "use or carry a firearm" phrase
strongly indicates an eventive interpretation of use,'75 and because the
change from "any felony" to "crime of violence" also points to a link
between firearm use and a specific event, it seems very unlikely that this
drafting change was intended to signal that use a firearm could now be
given a designative interpretation. The most plausible explanation is that no
change in the relation between use a firearm and the precursor crime was
intended:'76 Congress merged the two subsections to avoid having to
174. The en bane Bailey opinion appears to acknowledge this point when it distinguishes violent
crimes like aggravated bank robbery-where "[o]f course one must somehow threaten another with a
dangerous weapon"-from "furtive" crimes like drug possession, where "one should expect the firearm"
to be "secreted." United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1994).
175, The Senate Report contrasted "use" with "carry" in a way that is consistent with our analysis.
It stated: "Evidence that the defendant had a gun in his pocket but did not display it, or refer to it, could
nevertheless support a conviction for 'carrying' a firearm in relation to the crime if from the
circumstances or otherwise it could be found that the defendant intended to use the gun if a contingency
arose .... " S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 314, n.10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3492
n. 10 (emphasis added). In his dissent from the en bane Bailey opinion, Judge Williams interpreted this
passage from the Senate Report as showing that,
[T]he Senate evidently saw "use" as a comparatively narrow term, with "carry" picking up
cases of an alternative type of activity, where the defendant did not actively "use" the
weapon. The majority has turned this relation around, giving "use" such a broad meaning as
to leave no apparent role for "carry".
36 F.3d at 122-23 (Williams, J., dissenting).
176. Indeed there is evidence that the "to commit" phrase was still understood to implicitly modify
"uses a firearm," as illustrated by this quote from the Senate Report: "For example, a person convicted
of armed bank robbery.., and of using a gun in its commission (for example, by pointing it at a teller
or otherwise displaying it whether or not it is fired) would have to serve five years ... ." S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 314 (citation omitted). If the shift from "use to commit" to "use during and
in relation to" was intended to expand the meaning of use a firearm to include the designative
interpretation, one would have expected the Senate Committee to carefully avoid the old terminology
and to use instead the new phrase in its example (e.g., "a person convicted... of using a gun during
and in relation to the robbery").
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repeat the cumbersome new parenthetical ("including a crime of violence
which provides for an enhanced punishment... ") and added "in relation"
only with "carries during" in mind to establish a stronger link between
firearm carrying (even lawfully) and the precursor crime for liability. 77
"Use a firearm to commit a crime of violence" and "use a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence" might have been considered so close
in meaning that it would have been unnecessary to retain the separate
subsections just to retain the "to commit" language.1 78
C. The 1986 Amendment
Section 104 of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986179 enacted
the following scattered amendments to the firearms penalty:
[Amend 924] subsection (c)-
(A) by inserting "(1)" before "Whoever,";
(B) by striking out "violence" each place it appears and inserting in lieu
thereof "violence or drug trafficking crime,";
(C) by inserting "or drug trafficking crime" before "in which the firearm
was used or carried.";
(D) in the first sentence, by striking out the period at the end and inserting
in lieu thereof ", and if the firearm is a machinegun, or is equipped with
a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for ten years.";
(E) in the second sentence, by striking out the period at the end and
inserting in lieu thereof ", and if the firearm is a machinegun, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for
twenty years."; and
(F) by adding at the end the following:
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'drug trafficking crime'
means any felony violation of Federal law involving the distribution,
manufacture, or importation of any controlled substance (as defined in
section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term 'crime of violence' means an
177. According to the Senate Report,
[T]he requirement that the firearm's use or possession be 'in relation to' the crime would
preclude its application in a situation where its presence played no part in the crime, such as
a gun carried in a pocket and never displayed or referred to in the course of a pugilistic
barroom fight.
Id. at 314 n.10.
178. Redrafting to retain "to commit" would have produced a very awkward phrase: "uses or carries
a firearm to commit a crime of violence."
179. Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988)).
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offense that is a felony and-
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense."'8 0
There is no evidence from the legislative history that any of these
amendments, including the addition of "drug trafficking crime," were
intended to indicate a designative interpretation of use a firearm.'8' As
discussed above, the best textual argument for a designative interpretation
(implausible though we believe it to be) is that the addition of "drug
trafficking crime" complicated the concept of "using a firearm during a
crime" because one drug trafficking crime is the non-eventive crime of
possession with intent to distribute, the precursor crime in the Bailey and
Robinson cases. However, "drug trafficking crime" when first added in
180. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 456-57 (1986).
181. Indeed, there is once again evidence from a committee report that the "use or carry" phrase
was understood as limiting use to an eventive interpretation. The Firearms Owner's Protection Act
of 1986 originated in the Senate as Senate Bill 49. S. 49, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). This Senate Bill
contained a controversial new provision that would have created a self-defense exception to the firearms
penalty. S. 49, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(2) (1985). The House rejected the self-defense proposal with
this explanation in the Report of the House Judiciary Committee:
Proponents of the self-defense amendment point out that the defense is not available to one
protecting himself 'from the danger which was the direct result of the commission of or
attempt to commit a felony.' They argue that a felon who uses a gun in the commission of
a felony or in a shoot out with police while fleeing cannot therefore claim self-defense, since
he is prot.cting himself from a danger that was the direct result of the felony. While this
reasoning may rule out a successful self-defense claim in most situations in which the use
branch of the offense forms the basis of the mandatory penalty prosecution, it would not have
the same weight in the case of prosecution for carrying a firearm during the commission of
a felony. Indeed, the 'carrying' branch of the offense might be decimated, in that the felon
could claim that he was only carrying the weapon for defense against other felons, and cite
the fact that he did not actually use the weapon as proof of his claim. For example, a drug
trafficker, if charged with carrying a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) in connection with drug
trafficking, might be able to reasonably sustain a claim that it was carried for protection
against rival traffickers.
H R. Rep No. 495, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1336 (emphasis
added).
The narcotics experts whose testimony was offered against both Bailey and Robinson based their
conclusions that the guns were "used in relation" to drug crimes on their knowledge that drug dealers
"generally use guns to protect themselves from other drug dealers." United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d
106, 108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Thus the hypothetical posed in the House Report seems descriptive of
Badev and Robinson facts. Yet the House Report assumes that such a drug dealer who "uses a gun 'for
protection against rival traffickers"' could successfully defend himself from a charge under 924(c)(1)
as it would be amended by the pending bill because he "did not actually use the weapon." 1986
US C.C.A.N. 1336.
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1986, was defined as "distribution, manufacture, or importation" of drugs
(all crimes involving time-bound events), not mere possession.'82 We
must therefore look to the 1988 amendment that redefined "drug trafficking
crime" to include "possession with intent to distribute."
D. The 1988 Amendment
The current definition of "drug trafficking crime" in the firearms penalty
is the result of a 1988 amendment. 183 Reporting to the Senate as chair of
the judiciary committee, Senator Biden provided the following explanation
of the amendment: "The present definition of 'drug trafficking crime',
however, covers offenses involving the distribution, manufacture, and
importation of controlled substances, but does not cover either possession
with intent to distribute, or attempt and conspiracy violations."'84 The
amendment "adds" possession with intent to distribute in a rather obscure
way: "For purposes of this subsection, the term 'drug trafficking crime'
means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 801 et seq.) the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21
U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C.
app. § 1901 et seq.)." 85 One must read section 801 and the subsequent
sections of Title 21 to discover that possession with intent to distribute is
now a "drug trafficking crime" for purposes of the firearms penalty.
The amendment was uncontroversial. Nothing in its legislative history
indicates that Congress was aware that changing the definition of "drug
trafficking crime" might have any effect on the meaning of use afirearm.
E. Unsuccessful Attempts to Add "Possess"
Beginning as early as 1989 and continuing up to the date of writing,
members of Congress have been attempting to amend the firearms penalty
with the stated goal, "to broaden the prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)...
to reach persons who have a firearm or explosive available during the
commission of certain crimes, even if the firearm is not carried or used...
[for example,] a situation in which a loaded firearm was found in the
dresser drawer of an apartment which the defendant utilized in connection
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text..
183. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4181, 4360 (1988).
184. 134 CONG. REc. S17,360-02 (November 10, 1988).
185. PuB L. No. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4181, 4360 (1988).
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with his drug dealings."' 6 We begin with the 1989 proposal, originating
with the Bush administration 7 and introduced by Republicans in both
houses as part of larger crime bills, which was simply to add "or otherwise
possesses" after "uses or carries" ("1989 Republican Proposal").' The
legislative history contains several explicit statements that this proposal was
a response to a recent Second Circuit decision with facts almost identical
to those in the Robinson case, that reversed a conviction because the
defendant had not "used or carried" the gun found in his apartment. 8 9
This proposal was referred to the democratically controlled House and
Senate Judiciary Committees in 1989190 and never re-emerged. However,
the following year Senator Gramm succeeded in adding a somewhat
different proposal by way of floor amendment to the Democrats' crime
bill. 9' The Gramm proposal would have replaced "uses or carries" with
"possesses" and defined "possession of a firearm" as: "(i) in the case of a
crime of violence, the person touches the firearm... at any time during
the commission of the crime; and (ii) in the case of a drug trafficking
crime, the person has a firearm readily available at the scene of the crime
during the commission of the crime" ("1990 Gramm Proposal"). 92
Gramm's proposal also would have imposed a minimum sentence for such
possession of ten years (as compared to five for using or carrying under the
current statute), added a twenty year mandatory sentence applicable to
"[w]hoever... discharges a firearm with intent to injure another person,"
and imposed the death penalty if the death of a person results from the
discharge of the firearm.'9 3 The 1990 Gramm Proposal did not appear in
186. 135 CONG. REc. S13079 (daily ed. June 22, 1989) (section-by-section analysis of § 113,
S.1225).
187. See Hearings on H.P, 2709 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 20 Sess. 69 (statement of Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Assistant Attorney General).
188. See S. 1225, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 113 (1989); H.R. 2709, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 113
(1989) (Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1989).
189. United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1988). This case is discussed in the
section-by-section analysis appended to Senator Thurmond's bill. 135 CONG. REc. S13079 (daily ed.
June 22, 1989). Assistant Attorney General Robert S. Mueller III also mentioned Feliz-Cordero in his
statement to the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice. Hearings on H.R. 1400 Before
the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
I 1-12 (statement of Robert S. Mueller mI, Assistant Attorney General).
190. 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,028 (status of S. 1225); 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35, 045 (status of H.R.
2709),
191. S. 1970, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990).
192. 136 CONG. REc. S8994 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (Gramm Amendment 2084 to S. 1970).
193. Id.
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the final bill as enacted. 94
In 1991, Senator Biden, chair of the Judiciary Committee, introduced a
crime bill that would have replaced "uses or carries" with "discharges, uses,
carries or otherwise possesses," and created a scale of enhanced punishment
depending on the type of firearm involved ("1991 Biden Proposal").'95
Unlike the 1990 Gramm Proposal, it did not contain a definition of
"possession." The proposal passed the Senate but did not survive the
conference.'96
In 1992, Senator Thurmond introduced a crime bill that would have
replaced "uses or carries" with "knowingly uses, carries or otherwise
possesses" and defined "possession" as "the person has a firearm readily
available at the scene of the crime during the commission of the crime"
("1992 Republican Proposal").'97 Like the 1990 Gramm Proposal, it
imposed a ten year sentence for "possession" and a twenty year sentence
if the firearm was discharged with intent to injure.' 98 This bill was
referred to committee,' 99 and when it was not reported out, several
194. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990). The Conference
Committee did not issue a report. Instead a much shortened compromise bill was introduced and passed
in each house. See 136 CONG. REc. S17600 (daily ed. October 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden). We
could find nothing in the legislative history that explicitly explained why the Gramm amendment was
dropped, although the debate in the Senate included remarks by Senator Kennedy criticizing the
excessive use of mandatory sentencing. 136 CONG. REc. S8998 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy). There was also considerable opposition to the death penalty provision. 136 CONG.
REC. S9021 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statements of Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Kerry).
195. S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1212 (1991).
196. Complicating the history of S. 1241 was the amendment introduced by Senator D'Amato to
create a new firearms penalty provision aimed at a person who "knowingly possesses" a firearm during
and in relation to a state crime. 137 CONG. REC. S8846 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen.
D'Amato). Floor debate on the D'Amato amendment focused on the considerable expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction it would create. Id. at S8848-9 (comment of Sen Biden); id. at 8850 (comment of
Sen. Bingaman). Nonetheless, the amendment passed, id. at S. 8851. The amended S1241 then passed
the Senate. 137 CONG. RFc. S9832 (daily ed. July 11, 1991).
We could find nothing in the legislative history about opposition in the House or the Conference
Committee to the Biden proposal to amendment 924(c)(1). However, a motion in the House to instruct
their conferees to accept the D'Amato amendment failed. 137 CONG. REC. H10747 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
1991). Neither proposed Senate amendments to section 924(c) survived conference in the face of a
House bill that contained no such provision. Unlike the previous year, there was a conference report
to the enacted bill, but once again we could find no explanation there or anywhere else in the legislative
history for the disappearance of the 1991 Biden Proposal. See H.R. REP. No. 102-405, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 200 (1991) (Conference Report on H.R. 3371, The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1991).
197. S. 2305, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1992).
198. S. 2305, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1992).
199. 138 CONG. RFc. S2680 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992).
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republican senators attempted unsuccessfully to add the proposal as an
amendment to various bills on the floor.2"
In 1993, then-minority leader Senator Dole introduced a comprehensive
crime bill2 1 that included the same language amending the firearms
penalty as was contained in the 1992 Republican Proposal ("1993
Republican Proposal").02 The bill was reported to committee and did not
re-emerge.0 3
At the date of writing, there is a bill pending, introduced by Representa-
tive Barr (R-Ga) on April 7, 1995 that contains yet another proposal to
amend the firearms penalty. ("1995 Barr Proposal")."' This bill would
replace "uses or carries" with three different provisions: (1) if a person
"possesses a firearm," the sentence is five years, (2) if a person "brandishes
a firearm," the sentence is ten years, and (3) if a person "discharges a
firearm with intent to injure another person" the sentence is twenty
years.205 The 1995 Barr Proposal contains identical firearms penalties for
federal and state precursor crimes.0 6 The bill was referred to the House
200. See 138 CONG. REC. S6116, 6130 (daily ed. May 6, 1992) (proposal by Sen. Gramm to amend
Telephone Privacy Act); 138 CoNG. REC. S16360, S16374 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (proposal by Sen.
Smith to amend Public Service Health Act); 138 CONG. REc. S7812, S7827 (daily ed. June 10, 1992)
(proposal by Sen. Gramm to amend Workplace Fairness Act); 138 CONG. REC. S6745, S6760 (daily
ed., May 14, 1992) (proposal by Sen. Gramm to amend National Voter Registration Act).
201. 136 CONG. REc. S10384, S10422 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1993) (statements of Sen. Dole).
202. S. 1356, 103d cong., 1st Sess. § 1007 (1993).
203. 136 CONG. REc. at S10384. However, on November 9, 1993, Senator D'Amato successfully
repeated his strategy of 1991. Once again he amended the crime bill that was reported from committee,
S 1607, to insert language similar to the 1991 D'Amato Proposal. 139 CONG. REC. S15386-87 (daily
ed Nov. 9, 1993) ("The 1993 D'Amato Proposal"). The 1993 D'Amato Proposal did not include the
final phrase "during the commission of the crime" at the end of the definition of "possession" as did
the 1991 D'Amato amendment. The amendment was passed by a vote of 58-42. Id. at S15409. Even
after the D'Amato amendment added a new firearms penalty related to state crimes, S. 1607 did not
contain an amendment to the existing federal crimes provision in 924(c)(1) as appeared in the 1992 or
1993 Republican Proposals. The House voted to instruct its conferees to retain the D'Amato
amendment. 140 CONG. REc. H5930 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (motion by Rep. McCollum, passed 291-
128) The Senate did the same. 140 CONG. REc. S6078-88 (daily ed. June 19, 1994) (motion by Sen.
Gramm). See also id. at S6092-98. Despite these instructions, the version reported out of the Conference
Committee and subsequently enacted into law did not contain the D'Amato amendment.
204 HR. 1488, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995), 141 CONG. REC. H4430 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995)
(introduced by Rep. Barr).
205. If the firearm discharged is a short barreled rifle or a short-barreled shotgun, the provision
would also add another five years to the sentence enhancement, and if the firearm is a machine gun,
destructive device, or is equipped with a silencer or muffler, the mandatory sentence would be thirty
years. Id.
206. Id.
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Judiciary Committee 7 and has not yet been reported out of committee.
Under the conventional canons of statutory interpretation, these various
unsuccessful proposals to amend the firearms penalty would be given
relatively little weight. First, the views of a later Congress about the
meaning of a statute enacted by an earlier Congress are considered
uninformative about the intent and goals of the enacting Congress." 8
Second, the failure of a later Congress to pass proposed changes to a statute
cannot be taken as evidence that the later Congress was satisfied with that
statute. 09 Given the enormous complexity of the legislative process, there
are many reasons a piece of legislation may fail to pass that have nothing
to do with the merits of any particular component of that legislation.210
We find the legislation history of the past six years relevant for different
reasons. We look to this history as evidence of a coherent discourse within
Congress, spanning from session to session, that is consistent with the
discourse we find in everyday English and in the text of Title 18. This
evidence counters concern that the way Congress talks about the firearms
penalty may be based on a specialized discourse that differs in important
ways from the more generalized discourse found in the newspaper and in
the Title 18 materials.
The history of unsuccessful amendment proposals displays several
features of semantic interest:
1. Among all the variety of creative ways of rewriting the firearms
penalty proposed at different times, in different houses, and by legislators
of different parties-all proposals that seem designed to bring cases like
Bailey and Robinson within the statute-none can be found that define or
clarify use to indicate it should be given a designative interpretation of the
sort given in the en banc Bailey opinion.2"! All the proposals seem based
on a natural linguistic intuition that cases like Bailey and Robinson should
be described in terms of the non-eventive verb possess.
2. The 1990 Gramm Proposal212 seems to recognize the semantic
difference between an "eventive" crime of violence and a potentially "non-
207. 141 CONG. REc. H4430 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995).
208. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1452-53 (1994).
209. Id.
210. Indeed, our suspicion is that the various proposals to amend "uses or carries" particularly the
Gramm and D'Amato amendments that passed the Senate, failed to be enacted because they were tied
to more controversial changes such as adding a death penalty provision or expanding the statute to
cover firearms possession during state crimes.
211. See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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eventive" drug trafficking crime (like possession with intent to distribute)
by defining possess differently for each crime. In the case of a crime of
violence, firearm possession is defined almost as an eventive use: "the
person touches the firearm. 21 3 In the case of a drug trafficking crime, the
firearm possession is similar to designative use: "The person has a firearm
readily available. 2
14
3. The hierarchy of danger we identified above2' 5-- ranging from
discharge to possession-is explicitly recognized in the 1995 Barr Proposal:
twenty years for discharge, ten years for brandishing, and five years for
possession.
216
Our linguistic analysis indicates that to give a designative interpretation
to use a firearm in its current statutory context is contrary to linguistic
"common sense" and also imperils "common sense" in a different way-by
undermining the goal of maintaining a coherent legal discourse in which
words retain their meaning as much as possible in different provisions of
the criminal code. The recent history of congressional efforts to "improve"
the firearms penalty strongly suggests that even if a court elected to
"rewrite" the statute by giving it a different interpretation than ordinary
meaning provides, a court would make "more sense" by reformulating the
statute with new terminology rather than straining to accomplish its purpose
by trying to employ use with a designative meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
We have used the analytical methods and terminology of linguistics not
only to explore and explicate patterns of everyday usage, but also as
heuristic devices for examining legislation history and judicial decisions
relating to the firearms penalty. We do not claim that this approach should
dictate the "right" or even the wisest outcome to the Supreme Court's
impending decision of the Bailey and Robinson cases. Judicial
decisionmaking can and often should take into account factors other than
the ordinary meaning of legislative text. But we hope that this analysis has
shown what a rich and subtle resource is provided by ordinary language,
a resource that should not be lightly disregarded by either legislatures or
courts.
213. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
216. The hierarchy is less fully developed but still present in the 1990 Gramm Proposal and the
1992 and 1993 Republican Proposals, all of which single out "discharge" for additional punishment.
See supra notes 192, 198 and 202 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX ONE
Here are some contexts taken from a collection of British and American
newspaper usages. Columns 2 and 3 identify the phrase that stands for "[a
firearm]" in the phrase "use [a firearm]" and a modifying phrase that
influences its interpretation.
In examples where the modifier is a prepositional phrase with "against"
or "on", "use [a firearm]" in the sense of "fire a firearm" actually stands
for the main activity, and the phrases with "against" or "on" represent the
targets or victims of a weapon-discharging act.
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
use firearms against a moving vehicle
use guns against brother Palestinians
use live weapons against demonstrators
use his weapon against the defenseless citizenry
use firearms against the police
use weapons against their own people
use machine guns against unarmed civilians
and tanks
use weapons on them
The next example has two accompanying phrases: "as a club" and "to try
to put an injured porcupine out of its misery." In this case, the shotgun is
used because of physical properties unrelated to the fact that is a firearm.
(That property is not unrelated to the sentence as a whole, however; the
man killed himself while doing this.)
use his shotgun as a club to try to put an injured por-
cupine out of its misery
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The phrases using the preposition "for" in the following examples
present quite general purposes, suggesting just having the weapon available
in the "protection" cases and shooting when the occasion arises in the
"hunting" cases.
use a gun for his personal protection
use guns for hunting
use guns for hunting and target practice
use guns for hunting or sport shooting
use guns for law enforcement or crime pre-
vention
use guns for protection
use the Armstrong for just this purpose
gun II
A phrase with "in" followed by phrases designating specific military
actions invites the interpretation that the weapons were fired, since these
modifying phrases refer to specific events.
use a heavy calibre in an attack
machine gun
use a gun in IRA attacks
use Kalashnikov in recent Continental attacks
AK-47
assault rifles
use the rifle in the shootings
use weapons in the invasion
1995] 1205
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"Marked infinitive" phrases as modifiers invite an interpretation that
depends on the nature of the act introduced by the phrase following the
word "to." Consider the following examples:
use rifles to break up the crowd
use firearms to frighten
use a gun to get away
use the gun to kill Lee Harvey Oswald
use guns to kill or maim thousands of citi-
zens each year
use guns to kill people
use virtually every to kill rabbits
gauge of shotgun
use a gun to kill someone in self-defense
use weapons to quell public demonstrations or
riots
use guns, teargas, and to regain control
helicopters
use these weapons to regain the Holy Sepulchre
use a Luger pistol to shoot Brian Hayward
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APPENDIX TWO: "USE OR CARRY"
This appendix lists a variety of sentences which a British associate of
Fillmore's found by looking in the British National Corpus for combina-
tions of use and carry in relation to gun, firearm, rifle, pistol, shotgun or
weapon. See supra note 92. Since we were not provided with exact
citations, we do not offer this list as proof that these variations of carry and
use have actually occurred in everyday discourse, like newspaper articles.
Believing the usages in question to be noncontroversial, we simply rely on
the reader's linguistic intuitions to recognize each example as an acceptable
and readily interpretable expression. For ordinary purposes of linguistic
analysis, the native speaker's acceptability judgments and interpretative
abilities are central, and so the examples would be equally relevant if they
had been the product of Fillmore's linguistic introspection. Nevertheless,
we provide the data Fillmore used in order to illustrate one technique of
linguistic analysis: searching data bases of naturally occurring texts to
support and augment the linguist's capacity to imagine and generate data
for analysis and examples for illustrating particular types of linguistic
phenomena.
What if there's a scrap and I do have to fire at them and they return it; for
after all, as I've said, we don't really know whether they carry guns; all we
know is they haven't used them yet.
The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery and possession of a firearm with
intent to commit an indictable offence on the basis that he knew that a gun
was being carried, that he did not know it was loaded, and he did not
incite or order or suggest that the gun should be used.
"We were taught to carry and use guns," boasted Chivite, who does not
know his age but looks about 10.
"British tourists do not realize that most muggers here carry guns and do
not hesitate to use them," says Barry Jolly, chairman of the British
Chamber of Commerce in Orlando.
Zack carried a gun, and knew he would use it to get away.
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Mr. Nagdi had been carrying a gun when he left for work yesterday but he
did not get a chance to use it.
You carry any weapon, whether it be a knife, baseball bat or gun, and in
the end you'll use it.
"MUGGERS HERE CARRY GUNS-AND USE THEM"
They have to be taken seriously, because so many carry weapons which
they are prepared to use, as the next story shows.
People who carry weapons into bank premises and threaten to use them
must receive a severe sentence.
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APPENDIX THREE
EXAMPLES OF "USE A GUN\FIREARM\WEAPON\EXPLOSIVE" IN
TITLE 18
A. EVENTIVE USE
BY THE USE OF
§ 844. Penalties (h) [i]ncluding a felony which provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the USE of a deadly or dangerous WEAPON
or device.
§ 2113. Bank robbery and incidental crimes
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense
defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person,
or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the USE of a dangerous
WEAPON or device, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than twenty-five years, or both.
§ 2114. Mail, money, or other property of United States
(a) [I]f in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery he wounds the
person having custody of such mail, money, or other property of the
United States, or puts his life in jeopardy by the USE of a dangerous
WEAPON, or for a subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned not more
than twenty-five years.
§ 3665. FIREARMs POSSESSed by convicted felons
A judgment of conviction for transporting a stolen motor vehicle in
interstate or foreign commerce or for committing or attempting to
commit a felony in violation of any law of the United States involving
the USE of threats, force, or violence or perpetrated in whole or in
part by the USE of FIREARMs, may, in addition to the penalty
provided by law for such offense, order the confiscation and disposal
of FIREARMs and ammunition found in the POSSESSion or under
the immediate control of the defendant at the time of his arrest.
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CAUSE THROUGH THE USE OF
§ 924 (i). A person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c),
causes the death of a person through the USE of a FIREARM, shall-()
if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111), be punished by death
or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and (2) if the killing
is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in
that section.
INVOLVING THE USE OF
§ 930. Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in federal facilities
(c) A person who kills or attempts to kill any person in the course of
a violation of subsection (a) or (b), or in the course of an attack on a
Federal facility involving the USE of a FIREARM or other dangerous
WEAPON, shall be punished as provided in sections 1111, 1112, and
1113.
§ 1751. Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, kidnapping, and
assault; penalties
(e) Whoever assaults any person designated in subsection (a)(2) shall
be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both; and if the assault involved the USE of a dangerous WEAPON,
or personal injury results, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
§ 5032. Delinquency proceedings in district courts; transfer for criminal
prosecution
In considering the nature of the offense, as required by this paragraph,
the court shall consider the extent to which the juvenile played a
leadership role in an organization, or otherwise influenced other
persons to take part in criminal activities, involving the USE or
distribution of controlled substances or FIREARMs.
THE USE OF
§ 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law
[O]r if such acts include the USE, attempted USE, or threatened USE of
a dangerous WEAPON, EXPLOSIVEs, or fire, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
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§ 245. Federally protected activities
[O]r if such acts include the USE, attempted USE, or threatened USE of
a dangerous WEAPON, EXPLOSIVEs, or fire shall be fined under this
title, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
USED AGAINST
§ 3559. Sentencing classification of offenses
(c)(2)(A) [T]he term "assault with intent to commit rape" means an
offense that has as its elements engaging in physical contact with another
person or USING or brandishing a WEAPON against another person with
intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in
sections 2241 and 2242).
§ 3592. Mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in determining
whether a sentence of death is iustified
(c)(2) Previous conviction of violent felony involving FIREARM. For
any offense, other than an offense for which a sentence of death is
sought on the basis of section 924(c), the defendant has previously
been convicted of a Federal or State offense punishable by a term of
imprisonment of more than 1 year, involving the USE or attempted or
threatened USE of a FIREARM (as defined in section 921) against
another person.
USED AS
§ 3559. Sentencing classification of offenses
(c)(2)(D) [T]he term "firearms USE" means an offense that has as its
elements those described in section 924(c) or 929(a), if the FIREARM
was brandished, discharged, or otherwise USEd as a WEAPON and
the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during and relation to
which the FIREARM was USEd was subject to prosecution in a court
of the United States or a court of a State, or both.
USED DURING
§ 2261 Interstate domestic violence
(b)(3) [F]or not more than 10 years, if serious bodily injury to the
offender's spouse or intimate partner results or if the offender USEs a
dangerous WEAPON during the offense.
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§ 2262. Interstate violation of protection order
(b)(3) [F]or not more than 10 years, if serious bodily injury to the
offender's spouse or intimate partner results or if the offender USEs a
dangerous WEAPON during the offense.
USED FOR
§ 930. Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal facilities
(g)(2) The term "dangerous WEAPON" means a WEAPON, device,
instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate, that is USEd for,
or is readily capable of, causing death or serious bodily injury."
USED IN
§ 930. Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal facilites
(b) Whoever, with intent that a FIREARM or other dangerous
WEAPON be USEd in the commission of a crime, knowingly
POSSESSes or causes to be present such FIREARM or dangerous
WEAPON in a Federal facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
USED TO
§ 844. Penalties (d) Whoever transports or receives, or attempts to transport
or receive, in interstate or foreign commerce any EXPLOSIVE with the
knowledge or intent that it will be USEd to kill, injure, or intimidate any
individual.
§ 844. Penalties (h) Whoever-(1) USEs fire or an EXPLOSIVE to commit
any felony.
§ 924. Penalties (h) Whoever knowingly transfers a FIREARM, knowing that
such firearm will be USED to commit a crime of violence."
§ 3592. Mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in determining
whether a sentence of death is iustified
(d)(4) USE of FIREARM. In committing the offense, or in furtherance of
a continuing criminal enterprise of which the offense was a part, the
defendant USEd a FIREARM or knowingly directed, advised, authorized,
or assisted another to USE a FIREARM to threaten, intimidate, assault, or
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injure a person.
USED WITH RESPECT TO
§ 922. Unlawful acts (x)(3)(A)(ii) [W]ith respect to ranching or farming
activities as described in clause (i), a juvenile may POSSESS and USE a
handgun or ammunition with the prior written approval of the juvenile's
parent or legal guardian
B. DESIGNATIVE USE
FOR (THE) USE
§ 925. Exceptions: Relief from disabilities
(a)(1) The provisions of this chapter, except for provisions relating to
FIREARMs subject to the prohibitions of section 922(p), shall not
apply with respect to the transportation, shipment, receipt, POSSES-
Sion, or importation of any FIREARM or ammunition imported for,
sold or shipped to, or issued for the USE of, the United States or any
department or agency thereof or any State or any department, agency,
or political subdivision thereof.
§ 925. Exceptions: Relief from disabilities
(a)(4) [A]ny FIREARM or ammunition which is (A) determined by
the Secretary to be generally recognized as particularly suitable for
sporting purposes, or determined by the Department of Defense to be
a type of FIREARM normally classified as a war souvenir, and (B)
intended for the personal USE of such member.
USED FOR
§ 921. Definitions (a)(4)(A) [O]r is a rifle which the owner intends to USE
solely for sporting, recreational or cultural purposes.
§ 922. Unlawful acts (b)(3)(B) [T]he loan or rental of a FIREARM to any
person for temporary USE for lawful sporting purposes.
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USED IN
§ 922. Unlawful acts (a)(2)(B) [A]nd other FIREARMs capable of being
concealed on the person, for USE in connection with his official duty.
§ 925. Exceptions: Relief from disabilities (d)(1) [I]s being imported or
brought in for scientific or research purposes, or is for USE in connection
-with competition or training pursuant to chapter 401 of title 10.
